ملف ١١٦٦/ ١٩٢٥ "الجزيرة العربية: نجد؛ المفاوضات مع ابن سعود بشأن مسألة العراق-نجد وحدود شرق الأردن؛ بعثة السير ج. كلايتون؛ اتفاقية بحرة، الثاني من نوفمبر ١٩٢٥" [و‎‎١‎٣‎٥] (٧٦٩/٢٧٦)

Britain. When it was evident that the Conference at Kuweit had
failed the tribes became disturbed and intrigues were started. He
had communicated his fears of trouble to His Majesty’s Government
and had been told in reply that a speedy settlement would be made.
Certain tribes in Trans-Jordan had attacked his subjects, namely,
the Shararat and portions of the Ruwalla tribe, and had taken from
them 80 herds (ra'iya). There had also been other raids, and he had
submitted protests to His Majesty’s Government, but had received
no reply. As no satisfaction had been given, and especially as no
reply had been received from His Majesty’s Government, the tribes
had taken matters into their own hands and he had been unable to
prevent them from retaliating. Subsequently he had submitted a
protest against the use of armoured cars and tanks. He was
anxious to prove that he was not responsible for that raid.
I replied that I was afraid that his arguments would not be very
convincing to the British Government especially as there vvas one
particular feature with regard to the raid in question that co ild not
be disregarded. It was a serious attack on the capital and seat of
government in Trans-Jordan, and I was sure that His Highness
must realise that His Majesty’s Government could not view it in the
light of an ordinary raid.
Ibn Sa‘ud insisted that the first attack had been against him. I
said that His Majesty’s Government were forced to regard the Kaf
district as a point from which Trans-Jordan could be threatened : it
might at any moment become the focus of an attack. I thought it
better, however, to leave this matter for the time being for further
reflection as already agreed. I was most anxious to come to an
agreement on this matter in the interests of future friendship
between His Majesty’s Government and His Highness, which I felt
would be in the interests of both and particularly, if I might say so,
of His Highness and his country, the State of Nejd. I concluded
by commenting on the atmosphere of good feeling that had prevailed
throughout our discussions, an atmosphere which differences of
opinion had not been permitted to dissipate.
His Highness replied that personal relations would always remain
unchanged as there were no ulterior motives in question. Friendship
between Great Britain and his country was not only friendship for
its own sake but would lead to reciprocal benefits and was in the
best interests of both countries. He thought that the differences
between us was similar to that between two political parties in Eng
land, both of which worked for the good of their country in their
own particular way.
I said there were two kinds of friendship, natural and artificial.
Natural friendships were lasting and survived temporary disagree
ment, but artificial friendships soon faded. I believed this was a
natural friendship and would come into its own in due course.
Ibn Sa'ud said he had something further to say on the question of
Kaf, and asked whether he should say It then or after the debates
on the other questions, to which I replied that, if it were all the
same to His Highness, I would prefer to wait until another day.
Ibn Sa‘ud then intimated that he was ready to discuss the other
subjects, and a meeting was fixed for the following day) (Thursday,
the 15th October).
Before leaving, I suggested that, on the Friday, His Highness
might desire to visit Mecca. I should be able to devote my time on