ملف ١١٦٦/ ١٩٢٥ "الجزيرة العربية: نجد؛ المفاوضات مع ابن سعود بشأن مسألة العراق-نجد وحدود شرق الأردن؛ بعثة السير ج. كلايتون؛ اتفاقية بحرة، الثاني من نوفمبر ١٩٢٥" [و‎‎١‎٣‎٦] (٧٦٩/٢٧٨)

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with regard to inspectors of boundaries which had not been agreed
upon, but that was a measure which could be discussed after other
matters had been settled; it was not yet clear what the duties of
t icse inspectors would be, and the matter could be left for the pre-
That I thought w^as the general situation, and it appeared to me
that the main point of difference concerned the return of tribes by
one Government on the demand of the other. I asked whether His
Highness would tell me if any general point of principle had been
His Highness intimated that he would like to reply informally. In
the first place, he said, all agreement should aim at promoting peace
and tranquillity on the border. He must state frankly that the inci
dents and happenings in ‘Iraq had been caused by people wishing
to promote trouble, and it was his firm conviction that, however far-
reaching an agreement, the desired peace and tranquillity would not
be attained unless one principle was laid down and acted upon by
both parties. The principle he advocated was to make the tribes in
both countries responsible to their Governments. So long as it
remained possible for certain tribes to leave their Government and
seek shelter under another Government, so long would there be no
peace whatever. An agreement which did not rest upon that
principle would not be worth five days’' purchase.
I observed that this w'as the main principle on which the two
parties at Kuweit had been unable to agree. It meant that each
Government, in His Highness’ view, should undertake, at the
request of the other Government, to return any tribe or portion ‘of
a tribe or party of individuals which mig-ht seek refug-e in the terri
tory of the other government.
Ibn Sa‘ud said that was what he asked for.
I enquired if His Highness found that tribes were in fact con
tinually passing from his territory to the other. He replied that this
did not happen on any large scale ; a few might go over for climatic
reasons—the absence or presence of rain would account for most of
those who did go—but they were isolated cases. There were ex
ceptions in the case of the Shammar and other tribes, but generally
speaking he knew his own people and did not think they would leave
him in any appreciable number, although trouble was always liable
to be caused by intrigues.
I stated that I was trying to get at the actual existing conditions,
and it appeared to me that, unless there was a general tendency of
his tribes to go over, the practical benefit of the measure for which
he was pressing was not very apparent. I had some difficulty in
appreciating the practical value of what His Highness laid down as
an essential principle for the prevention of raids.
Ibn Sa‘ud said that the main reason on which he based his demand
for laying down the principle referred to was that it would enable
him to check the movements of tribes who raid and those who cross
the border. It had been said that tribes raiding in another territory
would hardly be likely to raid tribes in their own territory, but that
kind of thing did happen. He instanced the case of Yusuf Sa'dun,
an ‘Iraqi Chief, who came over to His Highness but who was refused