ملف ١١٦٦/ ١٩٢٥ "الجزيرة العربية: نجد؛ المفاوضات مع ابن سعود بشأن مسألة العراق-نجد وحدود شرق الأردن؛ بعثة السير ج. كلايتون؛ اتفاقية بحرة، الثاني من نوفمبر ١٩٢٥" [و‎‎١‎٣‎٧] (٧٦٩/٢٨٠)

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give him everything- he wanted. If His Highness would consider
•.he advances which the Iraq Government had made he would see
that an agreement was possible which would certainly improve the
position compared with what it was to-day. To put it briefly, at
present there was no agreement at all except that both sides had
agreed that something should be done to improve order in both
countries. The remedy suggested by His Highness was that when
ever a tribe moved from one side to the other it should be sent back
* - at the request of its Government. The ‘Iraq Government could
not go as far as that, but were prepared to discourage tribes from
coming over by all possible means and to instruct their subordinates
to do the same. Also they would probably be willing, if a tribe
did go over, to take from it such guarantees as to deter it from
raiding and to come to an arrangement for the restitution of raided
property. 1 hat was the situation, and it appeared to be unreason
able to refuse to discuss those conditions.
I added that I thought I could see what was at the back of His
Highness’ mind; he was under the impression that the ‘Iraq Govern
ment would in practice do nothing in the matter. I was quite unable
to subscribe to that view, which, for all I knew, might be recipro
cated by the ‘Iraq Government towards His Highness. My only
possible attitude was to assume that both Governments were sincere
and would act loyally. I added that the question of extradition of
tribes was familiar to His Majesty’s Government and had been
frequently discussed between the Governments of India and
Afghanistan, but the Government of India had always refused to
entertain such an arrangement, not through obstinacy, but because
they had gone into the question thoroughly and had come to the
conclusion that it was not right or feasible. The situation at present
was that there was nothing to prevent ‘Iraq or Nejd from enticing
away tribes from the other, and if tribes did come over there was
nothing to guarantee their good behaviour. His Highness was
apparently rejecting certain concessions on the part of the ‘Iraq
Government which could not do any harm and which would certainly
improve the situation.
Sheikh Hafiz then endeavoured to relieve the tension by saying
that he would like to say a word or two in elucidation of the question.
There were two ways of seeking refuge. One was the hijra, that is
to say, the migration of a tribe which for its own convenience found
it necessary to settle in another country. The other was the refugee
in the stricter sense of the word. There were a number of tribes
living in Nejd who were at feud with each other, and if it became
known that there was to be no extradition treaty between Nejd
and ‘Iraq the door would be opened for those tribes to seek refuge
in the other country merely to escape punishment which might other
wise fall to their lot. What was required and what they were
working for was some kind of instrument which would put an
end to that kind of thing. It went without saying that if offending
tribes were free to seek shelter in the other country they would be
encouraged to commit raids and to plunder.
I said that, as we had been unable to come to any agreement, I
proposed to draw up a draft agreement and submit it to His High
ness so that we could discuss its terms in detail. That draft would
embody what the ‘Iraq Government was prepared to do, and, while
it -would not go so far as His Highness wished, it would go a long
way in the direction of his wishes.