ملف ١١٦٦/ ١٩٢٥ "الجزيرة العربية: نجد؛ المفاوضات مع ابن سعود بشأن مسألة العراق-نجد وحدود شرق الأردن؛ بعثة السير ج. كلايتون؛ اتفاقية بحرة، الثاني من نوفمبر ١٩٢٥" [و‎‎١‎٤‎٣] (٧٦٩/٢٩٢)

points which had been inserted which I could not accept or discuss
Nefd dTrert1 Cei hT ,ntere sts which had nothing- to do with
S are n 1C ' h mUSt be safe ^ uard ed. Trans-Jordan and
Iraq are on the mam air route, and there was the Jerusalem
Baghdad car route, and I could not consider proposals which in
fringed on those Imperial interests.
other 1 objections!^ ^ UnderSt0 ° d ' hat and asked whether 1 any
full P .p d that P erha P s Highness had not had time to study the
lull significance of his counter-proposals and did not fully appreciate
the interpretations which might be put on them. I had endeavoured
m wording my own articles to make them clear, frank and open •
understand the Ttu™ b< ; hInd . them ’ and 1 was at a loss to
understand the object of those alterations here and there, unless it
^as his intention to weaken my articles.
I bn Sa‘ud exclaimed with some warmth that he could not under
stand my attitude in refusing to discuss the matter. His own atti-
ude was in accordance with what he conceived to be his riirhts
coupled with the interests of Great Britain, and he did not think
ure was anyone in the British Government who would denv that
he had endeavoured to maintain British interests. He pointed out
that from the beginning of these negotiations any demand he had
put forward had been met invariably by a denial of discussion. He
was an Arab, accustomed to discuss matters in all their aspects and
so reach agreement, and to have his suggestions brushed aside
touched his pride.
I replied I thought His Highness could hardly say that I had not
given every opportunity for full discussion of all questions. I had
listened patiently to all that had been said at the different meetings
and had made considerable concessions in various directions. I had •
no doubt, and I thought the British Government had no doubt of
the good intentions of His Highness, and I also fully appreciated
that he had the interests of his own country to consider. On the
other hand I was in the position of representing His Majesty’s
Government, whose interests in certain directions" I was bound to
observe and, after full discussion, there must come a moment when
we either could or could not make those interests meet. We had
now reached the furthest point to which I found it possible to go,
find I had deemed it my duty to put up proposals representing my
limit. If His Highness on the other hand had reached what he con-
sidered to be his limit, then there was an unfortunate gap between
us which we were unable to bridge.
Ibn Sa‘ud said he would ask again whether I would state my
precise criticisms on his proposals. If there was anything in them
likely to be harmful to the interests of Great Britain, he begged that
I would point it out. He looked upon himself as the defender of
British interests and what I did not like in his demands he hoped
I would make known to him.
I said that I had already made my criticisms and I thought the
best course now would be for a final draft to be drawn up, after
details at issue h*id been informally discussed by Sheikhs Hafiz and
Yusuf with Mr. Antonins, and agreement reached wffiere possible.
A final draft could then be submitted to His Highness for his final