"معلومات عامة عن بلاد فارس لأي طبعة مستقبلية، ١٨٩٥" [و‎‎٣‎٠] (٢١١/٥٥)

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OUR TRADE WITH THE PERSIAN GULF.
OUR TRADE WITH THE PERSIAN GULF.
entered into with any spirit, six months ought to be amply
sufficient for the railway, or railways, to make a beginning.
But, as we have shown, it is a matter that is peculiarly the
Shah’s own, and affects himself, and he is bound, if Russia and
England cannot agree and continue to do nothing, to take it
up himself and carry it through. As he will benefit by the
measure, and as the capital can be obtained in no other way,
he must guarantee the interest, raising a loan, if necessary,
himself. It does mot matter, in this case whether the money
comes from England, or France, or Austria, or Russia, or even
America. He will consolidate and enrich his kingdom and
unite it with India and Central Asia, and thus acquire a name
similar to that of Nadir Shah, or Timour, or, going further,
of Alexander the Great, who also united India and Central Asia
to Persia ; or, we should say, a name even greater than
these greatest of all names in Asia. The thing should be done,
and can be done, and must come. Delay is injurious to all
concerned. Therefore it is to the interest of all to agree
to do it; and if diplomacy, and a sense of self-interest, should
fail with the foreign Powers, the Shah can end the difficulty
himself.
We have spoken above of a Grand Trunk line from East to
West, and possibly of one from North to South. In discussing
the subject of railways in Persia, it is absurd and unnecessary
to view it in any other than a commercial light. It is absurd
for England to say, in regard to it, that Russia is anxious only
to devour Persia ; just as absurd as it is for Russia to say
that, after Kabul and Beluchistan, England now wants to
incorporate Persia. We believe that both England in India
and Russia in Central Asia and the Caucasus are satisfied with
what they already have. In the North of Persia and in Georgia,
the Armenians seek autonomy, and would certainly fight
rather than be incorporated with Russia. The military way to
Teheran, even with a railway, would not be easy ; while Persia
united, well governed, and well drilled, could beat back even a
Muscovite invasion. There are magnificent, hardy mountain
races in Persia for soldiers. And, as for England in India
casting a covetous eye on Persia, we are sure even the Russians
themselves do not believe it.
Ridding ourselves of these fallacies and mistakes, let us glance
for an instant at the route of the Grand Trunk line from East to
West ; and also of the line from North to South, should that be
required simultaneously, as a counterpoise to the other. As will
be seen further on, this connection between the North and South
need not be an altogether separate line from the borders of
Russia to the Persian Gulf, but merely a connection between
Teheran and the North, and Shiraz and the Gulf, the interme-
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diate portion being supplied by the Grand Trunk line itself.
Hence, should Great Britain and Russia agree, the former would
have to spend very much the greater amount of capital, as
Russia need not take up more than the short connec
tion between Tiflis and Teheran, a distance of only 500
miles ; whereas England would have to pay for a
distance altogether of 1,500 miles for the Grand Trunk line,
and for the connection between Shiraz and Bunder Abbas,
another length of about 400 miles. We firmly believe this
plan would solve the question, as between England and
Russia, of Persian railways. At the least cost, Russia
would obtain a free outlet for her goods not only all over
Persia, but even to the Persian Gulf. England, of course, would
gain the same advantages.
Now let us look for a moment at the alignment of the Grand
Trunk line, and first at its starting point. Kurrachee has much
in every way, except strategical importance, to recommend
it. And here we should say that, in the case of any such
extensive line, we have to consider the commercial aspect first.
We want to open up Persia thoroughly to commerce, and
not—in this view—to safeguard Afghanistan. And such a
view would thoroughly allay Russia’s suspicions. A line start
ing from Quetta would, for almost half the distance, be purely
strategic, would have to cross immense deserts, and would
never pay. If the line is ever pushed further westward from
Quetta, or Chaman, it must be on purely strategic grounds,
and we are not considering the strategic defence of Afghanis
tan at present. The danger of Russia pushing down, through
the undefined portion of Western Beluchistan, to the Indian
Ocean, is purely imaginary. She would have to reckon not
only with Persia on the East, but further South with the
British Indian Government. As we have said, Kurrachee as
a starting point, has everything to recommend it. As a port of
Indian trade, it is advancing by leaps and bounds, and there
can be no doubt that, when Kurrachee is connected with Delhi,
half of the trade of Western India, and the whole of the trade
of North India, will flow into it. Then it has no extensive
desert to reckon with on its way westward. As far as Bunder
Abbas in the first section, say of 500 miles, the way is easy, and
mostly in British territory. Commercially, too, even this, the
least promising portion of the Grand Trunk, would most pro
bably pay. There are considerable quantities of grain and
cloth required at Bunder Abbas, and the cross cart-road from
the North would both take and bring trade ; besides there is the
through trade of Persia with India, which would have also to
go over this portion of the line. Then, there are several small
ports with inland traffic, which would be met with on the way.