مراسلات متنوعة، تقارير، خرائط وغيرها من الأوراق المتعلقة بالشرق الأوسط [و‎‎٣‎٢] (٢٢٠/٦٤)

Circulated by the Secretary of State for India.
SECRET.
My dear Curzon, 28th September 1917.
My view of the employment of Japanese troops is dilferent from ray
view of the employment of Chinese troops, for the former have a real military
value, and.therefore if they are employed in sufficient numbers, 1 cannot
argue that we are not doing something to aid our prospects of military
success.
Hut 1 have strong political objections to the employment of Japanese in
Asia, or with Indian troops, and these objections are certainly not fanciful,
even if they are not conclusive.
The employment of Japanese troops i'n itself makes me less apprehensive
than consideration of the price which we may have to pay for Japanese
assistance and of the footing which the Japanese would secure in Mesopo
tamia. The claims of the Japanese in Asia are w r ell known, and have been
emphasised by my predecessor; everything that I hear leads me to feel that
these aims are.growing in Japan. There are already indications of Japanese
attempts at commercial penetration in the Persian Gulf (besides those we
know of in India), and w'e may be sure that the Japanese Government w r ould
use any weapon that came to hand in furtherance of their aims. Commercial
influence in the Gulf leads inevitably to political influence, and it is clearlv
not in our interests to encourage a new rival. ' We do not want the Japanese,
for instance, to endeavour to obtain concessions for settlements at Basra and'
Baghdad, or to establish a line of steamers and subsidised export companies
in the Persian Gulf.
Further, it must be remembered that our policy is a policy of “ Mesopo
tamia for the Arabs,” and in pursuance of this w r e feel that we shall have to
restrict Indian immigration after the war to Mesopotamia within very narrow
limits. This will not be easy in any case, having regard to the part played
hyMudian troops in the Mesopetqmian campaign, but the difficulty of closing
the door to Indians will be sensibly increased if w r e find ourselves compelled
to hold it open to Japanese.
I now take the analogy suggested by you of France and Tsingtao. As
regards France, it differs from Mesopotamia in that I fancy that the latter
is regarded popularly as an “ Indian show.” India has furnished the
majority of the troops, and has served tbroughout'as the base of supply, &c.
The country has always had close connections, commercial, religious, Ac.,
with India, and falls geographically within the area usually regarded as the
sphere of India’s external relations.
Before the war the British Consul-General at Baghdad was normally an
officer of the Indian Political Department, and bore in addition to his Consular
designation the Indian title of “ Resident ” in Turkish Arabia. It is hardly
too much to say that the Mesopotamian operations have excited greater
general interest in India and have been regarded more in the light of a
domestic concern than those in any of the other great theatres of war. In
these circumstances the employment of Japanese troops in Mesopotamia
seems to me open to the same objections as those urged against the use of
Chinese troops at Aden. It has already been rumoured that we intend to
use Japanese troops to help us to maintain order in India itself. I would
hesitate to do anything that might give these rumours colour, and I do tlnnk
that the presence of Japanese might affect not only the Indians, but the
Arabs.
As regards Tsingtao, surely the Japs hope that they wall keep that for
themselves. 1 do not want them to think the same thing in a smaller degree
of Mesopotamia.
As I have admitted the military value of the Japanese, I can onlv ask
that these political considerations shall be taken into account when the
military question is being decided.
Yours sincerely,
The Right Hon. Edwin S. Montagu.
The Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.