"بلاد فارس - خاصةً سيستان" [و‎‎٨‎٢] (٩٤٩/١٦٢)

Appendix.
Colonel McMahon, whose knowledge of the country is unrivalled, takes
a favourable view of its mineral resources. I have just received a letter from
him on the subject, parts of which are printed as an Appendix.
W. A. J.
“ Your query about mineral resources is a difficult one. My own personal
belief is that a railway to Seistan would result in a large production of
minerals. The country has never been properly prospected, and, until a
railway comes, it never will be, because what pays to work near a railway is
useless to touch without a line. We know of old copper workings at Robat,
and we know of copper in the Ras Koh hills. We know of lead near Saindak,
and there are large quantities of sulphur and earth dyes in the Koh-i-Sultan.
The iron we found in the sand, and which we roughly estimated at of the
sand, has been carefully analysed at Calcutta, and proves to be good iron,
i.e., 65% of pure iron oxide. A day may come when some simple and cheap
form of utilising the wind to work electro magnets to catch the iron out of the
wind-driven sand, will make it worth while to work that iron and add to the
railway exports”.
The following remarks on the Seistan traffic, and the best route for the
extension beyond, are contained in the same letter:
Note. —I share this belief to some extent, hut it
requires something more than belief to warrant one
in recommending a line as a commercial undertaking.
It can be easily demonstrated by figures that, if
the cultivated area of Seistan were doubled, and the
export of grain encouraged by the Persian Govern
ment, a railway would pay working expenses, and
1 % or 2% on its capital cost.
If the area were trebled, it would be a paying
scheme. But these are hypotheses quite outside our
control, and other things besides canals would want
reorganisation first.
W. A. J.
ft q^e more we see of Seistan, and the more we work out the available
areas of irrigable land and volume of
available water, the more astonishing do
the future possible prospects of Seistan
appear. I believe, under any circum
stances, whether the Seistan canal systems
were reorganised or not, that a railway
would lead to an enormous grain export,
not to mention export of wool and hides
in which there are large openings. You
will doubtles say that sanguine expect
ations do not suffice to establish in figures a paying return on this or any other
line. I admit this, and realise that it is practically impossible to show that the
line will be a paying line for some time, but I adhere to my belief that the
time before the line does begin to pay will not be long. However, as the line,
to begin with, would be built for purely strategic and political objects, its
commercial aspect is not so important as it might be. * * *
“ I see no advantage in aiming at Nasratabad. It is a vile hole in every
sense. A name, nothing else, except, perhaps, a smell. I would advocate
sticking to open ground, and cutting across the southern portion of Seistan, by
Sekhowa and Yarmab, and getting across the Hamun by a long embankment.
It all depends, of course, how your line approaches the country.
“ If by Bund-i-Kamal Khan, from the east, it might proceed as above, or
via Tarakhun to Houzdar, &e., and then either northwards further into Seistan,
or straight across the Hamun. The Hamun is much about the same anywhere,
so far as obstacle goes, and so it does not seem to matter much where you cross
it. Seistan itself ouUide the canal area is easy everywhere.
If you approach
• i.e., the sandhills already referred to.
W. A. J.
Note. —It seems to me that, for an extension west
of the Hamun, the simplest arrangement would be
to round the south of the Hamun, and deal with
Seistan by a branch via Bund-i-Kamal Khan (as
shown on the plan) which could penetrate the
richest parts of the country; for canal bridges,
however numerous, are trifling things for a railway.
A12 feet bank, 20 miles long, tipped from both ends,
and pitched all along for a protection against waves,
would be very expensive.
W. A. J.
richest portion of Persian Seistan
Seistan from south of the Shelag, then the Shelag
presents a difficult obstacle,* and it be
comes a question whether it is not better
to avoid it, and work round the end of the
Haraun, and miss Seistan altogether. I
myself would advocate taking a line from
Bund-i-Kamal Khan on left bank, and
bending off in a curve south of the Rud-
i-Seistan, and across by Sekhowa to
the Hamun. This would
territory, and work through
tap Afghan
or near the