ملف ٤٧٢٢\١٩١٨ الجزء ٨ "بلاد الرافدين: الوضع" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎١] (٩٩٥/٤٥٣)

6
7. Immediate emergencies confronting us on the Euphrates could have
been promptly nipped in the bud had the existing armed forces of the Crown
in Mesopotamia been in a more efficient state than they now are. We do not
really require more units at present. What we chiefly want is to have existing
units brought up to strength in personnel and equipment. At present moment
though we were promised three' squadrons in Mesopotamia by April 15th,
K.A.F., are unable to keep more than 16 machines in the air in Mesopotamia
and Persia or to make more than 6 available for any single operation duriim
this critical period. Austin armoured cars cannot be sent out of Baghdad
owing to weakness or inefficiency of personnel. Tanks have been refused^us.
8. British units in the country contain such a large proportion of imma
ture and almost untrained young soldiers that they cannot be used for opera
tions during the hot weather whole brunt of which falls on Indian regiments.
Some of the Indian regiments supplied from India recently are much
below strength and I am credibly informed that half of regiment which
recently arrived at Basrah had not fired their first musketry course and there
were insufficient trained men in regiment to man its Lewis guns.
Every military department in Mesopotamia is greatly below strength in
subordinate personnel. British units in country are consequently further
depleted in order to meet essential departmental needs with the result that
some units cannot parade more than 800 strong.
Motor transport in country is worn out and of low efficiency. When for
example urgent call was made for current operations on 50 reserve lorries at
Bailhead, Quraitu, it was found that only 8 were serviceable.
Defence vessels are unreliable.
9. If Home and India will furnish us with efficient units, and keep them
up to the strength by a system of reliefs similar to tlfvt adopted in time of
war, thus enabling us .to send men on leave to India without depleting our
strengths, and making automatic provision for casualties, and if the War°Office
will send us'the equipment we need, I have little doubt that we shall carry on
all right with the existing units.
10. Finally in my judgment G.H.Q. in Mesopotamia should not again
leave Baghdad. The experience of the past two months convinces me that it
will be some years before this can be done without much administrative incon
venience and loss of efficiency, and, in an emergency serious risk.
11. Presuming that H.M.G. require an independent appreciation of the
situation I have not shown this to the Gr.O.C. -in-Chief but am sendino- him a
copy.
Addressed India Office, repeated Viceroy.
Telegram—P.
From—India Office, London.
To—Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.
No. Nil.
Dated 10th JTuly, 1920.
■Received 12th July, 1920.
Your telegram of the 9th June last 6948. War Office take exception to
your action m telegraphing to me your opinion ou military situation which
they regard as province of G.O.C.
In circumstances explained in last paragraph of your telegram I do not
take exception to your action m this instance but as general practice you should
avoid telegraphing to me on purely military matters without knowledge and
concurrence of General Officer Commanding.
Telegram—P. (Clear Line).
From—Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.
To—India Office, London.
No. 8422.
Dated 13th July, 1920.
Received
Your telegram of 10th July.
I am sorry that War Office take exception to my action but beg to point
out that as I explained at the time G.O.C.-in-Chief was absent in Northern
Persia and m any case had changed his headquarters for summer to Persian
hills.
^ le Political and military situation are so closely connected that I cannot
fulfil my duty to you without occasionally expressing an opinion on military
aspec i of situation, which cannot m my opinion at this juncture safely be
treated as a separate issue.
I submit that developments since I telegraphed to you on June 9th justify
my action.