أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [ظ‎‎٨] (١٧٦/١٦)

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63. Japanese Naval Forces would be distributed between bases in the south of
Japan and the defended base in the Pescadores, and there is nothing to prevent some
of her light forces having been sent to Port Malakal or other anchorage in the Pelew
or Caroline Islands.
64. The information that the Canal had been “ effectively " blocked would be the
signal for declaration of war by Japan and for the commencement of operations
against our bases, trade, communciations and oil depots in the Indian Ocean and
Far East.
65. Japan’s object would be to deprive our Fleet of the oil supplies and
maintenance facilities which had been gradually built up at Singapore and on the
route to the East during years of peace.
66. With this object in view, she could deliver heavy attacks against our trade
and naval resources at such places as Trincomali, Colombo, and even Aden, at the
same time making a military descent in overwhelming force on Singapore in the
certain knowledge of being able to achieve her object, or at least do considerable
material damage before the British Fleet could intervene.
The British Naval forces normally maintained in the East in peace time would
be unable to offer prolonged resistance, although they might at first impose additional
precautions on the enemy, which would sensibly delay operations against Singapore.
67. Considerations of the possible Courses of Action open to the British Fleet
would be governed by —
(a.) Uncertainty as to the time which would elapse before the block was
removed.
(b.) The difficulty, almost amounting to impossibility, of sending an adequate
Fleet to the East via the Cape in time to be of any practical help in
relieving the situation.
(c.) Doubt as to the fate of our Naval bases and resources in the East, and
especially of Singapore, which would be exposed to heavy attack without
possibility of early relief.
{d.) The moral effect of such a striking reverse on the outbreak of war, not only
on the Fighting Services, but on public opinion in belligerent and neutral
countries. The public outcry and press campaign directed against the
Admiralty and Government which would inevitably follow such an initial
success by the enemy might severely hamper our policy and have a
disastrous effect on the prosecution of the war.
68. As regards [a), the tendency is usually to underestimate the time taken to
complete salvage, demolition and dredging operations, as unforeseen difficulties are
apt to arise. Naval, Military and diplomatic action might be delayed in the hope
that the block would be cleared in three weeks or so, and a confused and hopeless
situation would arise as the end of this period approached without this hope showing
promise of being fulfilled.
69. As regards (b), this difficulty is due to the following factors :—
(i.) Lack of large oil depots on the Cape route; it will be remembered that until
1931 all our efforts are being concentrated on the creation of oil depots
on the route to the East via the Suez Canal.
(ii.) Delay in procuring and distributing the enormously increased numbers of
tankers on which the progress of the Fleet will be dependent in the
absence of shore oil installations.
(iii.) Distance to be traversed is nearly half as much again as via the Suez Canal,
i.e., United Kingdom to Singapore is 8,000 odd miles via Suez, and
11,000 odd miles via the Cape of Good Hope.
(iv.) Great distances between suitable fuelling ports in British territory en route,
in some cases exceeding the endurance of existing Light Craft. In this
connection it should be observed that technical considerations debar oil
burning ships from taking in fuel at sea or in unsheltered anchorages
with anything like the same degree of speed and reliance as was possible
in the case of coal-burning ships.
(v.) Reduction in average speed due to—
(i.) Limited capabilities of tankers, i.e., 10 knots.
(ii.) Need for economical steaming due to long distances between fuelling
ports.