أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎٢‎٣] (١٧٦/٤٥)

CIRCULATED TO THI CA^iNET,
| This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.
No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.
EGYPT AND SOUDAN.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 9507/10/16] No. 1.
\\
Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—{Received vk'ptember 24.)
(No. 637.)
My Lord, Ramleh, September 14, 1923.
I HAVE the honour to report that I had an audience of the King yesterday
morning.
2. After the usual compliments I said that the progress made during the summer,
thanks to the good relations between His Majesty, the Ministry and Lord Allenby, had
been noted with much satisfaction. On the eve of Zaghlul Pasha’s return and with
reference to certain indications of the Wafd’s intended policy, I thought it a suitable
occasion to remind His Majesty of the declaration of the 28th February, 1922, as a
result of which His Majesty had become King of an independent Egypt. To this
declaration there were now added two enactments having the force of international
agreements which could not be repudiated, namely, the Indemnity Act and the law
regarding the compensation and retirement of foreign officials. His Majesty said that
neither the declaration, without which there could have been no monarchy or
constitution, nor the Acts, could, of course, be called in question.
3. In the course of further conversation I touched on certain factors in the
situation which appeared to me to constitute some danger, notably the vanity and
megalomania of Zaghlul Pasha, who, in his desire to sweep the board at the elections,
might harbour an intention of undermining the Ministry in the hopes that an
administration might be brought in before the elections which would abandon the
neutrality of the present one and favour his party. I said His Majesty would
doubtless let Zaghlul Pasha know who was master, and I warned him against doing
anything which might indicate a bias on his part towards the Zaghlulists, as they
would not be slow to take advantage of it for self-advertisement. His Majesty replied
at once that he had no intention of countenancing anything of the sort, and, in reply to
my enquiry, he said I might inform His Majesty’s Government that he intended, until
the elections had taken place, to give his full support to Yehia Ibrahim Pasha and his
Ministry. 1 expressed satisfaction, and suggested on my part that it might be well if
His Majesty made some overt sign that the Ministry enjoyed his full confidence. He
replied that he had been thinking about that and had an idea of inviting them all to
some gathering, perhaps at Montaza, but he proposed to await the effect of Zaghlul’s
return before considering it further.
4. 1 then referred to another danger, namely, the possibility that some of Zaghlul
Pasha’s more hot-headed adherents might urge Zaghlul into a dangerous and extreme
line in foreign policy which would bring Egvpt into collision with Great Britain.
5. His Majesty assured me emphatically that every intelligent Egyptian, including
the Zaghlulists, realised Egypt’s only chance was to go hand in hand with Great
Britain—His Majesty himself had always been and was still firmly convinced of
this truth.
6. I said I hoped he was right, but it must be remembered that the Zughlulists
were for the most part men of no political experience, no stake in the country, some of
them adventurers and relying largely on the support of students, not therefore of the
class who would seem to have an interest in pursuing a prudent and conservative
policy so essential to maintain conditions of stabilitv during the inauguration of the
new regime.
7. His Majesty replied that, in his opinion, the political power of the future would
be found to reside not in the Zaghlulists or the Adlyists, but in the great bulk of those
whom he termed “ gentlemen farmers,” using the English expression. These had not
hitherto taken any part in politics, but would now find themselves forced to do so.
8. His Majesty then told me that Mohammed Said had asked His Majesty for
some special mark of his favour, but he had refused and told him he could continue
to sit on the four chairs with Prince Omar Toussoun, the ex-Khedive and the
Watanist leader.
[399 aa—2]