أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [ظ‎‎٩‎٢] (٢٩٠/١٨٤)

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steps which they were ready to take. The present strength of the
forces in Mesopotamia was about 246,00U. I his number included
followers, labourers, and services earmarked lor transfer to civil
administration. It was hoped that by the spring this total would
have been reduced to 156,000, and the eventual peace strength
which the War Office had in mind, including followers, was only
77,000. He added that it was difficult for the War Office to arrive
at a linal conclusion as to the peace strength of the garrison until
the larger question of policy had been decided, and until they knew
what was the extent of the area which the garrison would have to
protect. As matters stood at present the W ar Office had to be
prepared to despatch punitive expeditions to the Kurdish frontier.
He did not know to what extent His Majesty’s Government were
prepared to admit Kurdistan as a factor in Mesopotamian politics.
Tiie Chairman said that he would be sorry to see Kurdistan
brought forward as a reason for the retention of a large Army of
Occupation in Mesopotamia. Our Kurdish policy had not yet been
fully discussed owing to the fact that there was no one at present in
London who coidd put forward the Kurdish side of the question.
Sir Arthur Hirtzel pointed out that there were two distinct
questions at issue—the military occupation as such, and the handing
over of military departments to the civil administration. The first
of these questions was undoubtedly dependent upon the larger
question of policy, but the handing over of military departments to
the civil administration could, he thought, be proceeded with at
once.
Colonel Gribbon said that this was not a question for the
Director of Military Intelligence, but for the Quartermaster-General.
He understood, however, that the transfer of military departments to
the civil administration depended largely upon the rate of demo
bilisation. As soon as men were demobilised he thought that the
War Office were quite prepared for them to be replaced by the
employees of the civil administration.
Mr. Armitage-Smith said that this same point had been
-emphasised that afternoon (at a Conference held at the Treasury)
by Colonel Slater, who was financial adviser to the Acting Civil
'Commissioner.
Mr. Montagu observed that there appeared to be general agree
ment on this subject. The War Office were anxious to reduce
military formations in Mesopotamia and the civil authorities were
equally anxious to take over their duties.
The Chairman suggested that the War Office should telegraph
to the Commander-in-Chief, Mesopotamia, instructing him to report
what steps had already been taken in this respect, and what further
steps were contemplated, with the dates on which he hoped to be
able to transfer the various departments to the civil authorities.
The India Office might also telegraph to the Acting Civil Commis
sioner and ask him to what extent he would be prepared to take
over. With regard to the other proposals he had so far only sug
gested that Sir Percy Cox should be consulted. He would be glad
to know whether any other suggestion commended itself to the
Conference.
Major Young thought that it might perhaps be made clear to
some of our critics that the institution of councils in Mesopotamia
was a necessary step towards obtaining an articulate opinion from
the people when the time came for them to be consulted as to the
form which the constitution should take. He feared that the existing
councils were only exercising advisory functions, and that it was
not yet clear to the people that there was no intention of perpetuating
a direct British administration in Mesopotamia. He mentioned that.