Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎28r] (56/312)

hardy, General Roberts, besides bringing a variedT
experience, obtained from a 20 years' service in
the Quartermaster-General's Department, of which
he is the actual head, to bear on his new command,
has also the advantage of having served through
many campaigns, in all and each of which he has
earned distinction. At the siege of Delhi he i
earned the Victoria Cross for personal gallantry in
sabring a standard bearer and capturing his
/fe various operations connected with the
Relief of Lucknow and its subsequent siege and
capture saw him acting as an Assistant Adjutant-
General. For this campaign he received the brevet
of major, besides a medal and three clasps, and was
frequently mentioned m despatches. At the Um-
beyla Expedition in 1863 he was also present and
again mentioned. He served throughout the
Abyssinian war as Quartermaster-General of the
Bengal Brigade and was given a Lieute
nant-Colonelcy for his meritorious services.
As senior btaff officer he accompanied the Loo-
shae expedition of 1872, for which he re
ceived the Companionship of the Bath. General
Koberts has been mentioned no less than 23 times
in despatches, so that his past career and present
knowledge of the frontier, derived from lon^ study
of the question and personal acquaintance with the
ground, fully warrant the assertion that a better
selection for a Brigade leader could not have been
! made.
Conflicting as the news on this point is, it seems
probable t.hat, despite the early approach of an
Afghan winter, the Viceroy has determined on
energetic action, and already steps have been taken
for the formation of three columns : the northern
most one apparently intended to operate by the Khy-
ber Bass full details of which we gave our readers
in The limes of yesterday ; the central one vid the
Koorum Pass; and the left or southern column
under Brigadier-General F. S. Roberts, by the
Bolan to Khelat. It may be that these columns
will merely resolve themselves into corps of
observation destined not so much for the actual
invasion of the Ameer's territory as for the pur
pose of showing him thab we are prepared to
strike should he remain recalcitrant ; for although
there is no doubt that these three divisions
could easily make good their position in Afghanistan
before the winter sets in with all its severity, yet
it is by no means certain that provisions in suffi- j
cient quantities could be obtained in order to enable
them to withstand a siege in their winter quarters.
The collection of grain for such considerable
numbers, of forage for horses and fodder for the
camels, must prove a work of time ; and, remember
ing the suflerings and privations of the garrisons of
Jellalabad, Ghuznee, Cabul, and Candahar during
the winter of 1841-42 it may be thought well in
India to stay active operations until the weather
is fine enough for the Commissariat Department to
cater properly for the welfare of the army of
invasion.
Thall, the place where the central column
is ordered to concentrate, is a small town situated
on the left bank of the Koorum River. It is 66
miles south-west of Kohat, 42 miles due north of
Edwardesabad (Bunnoo), another military canton
ment of ours ; 168 miles by road from Cabul, and
198 from Ghuznee. It is at the westernmost point i
of the Kohat. district, at the extremity of a tongue
of land which juts forward into Afghanistan, and is
only 50 miles from Mahomed Azim's Fort, the
chief town of the Koorum province of Cabul.
Here there is a military governor and a small gar
rison, but the works are not of a nature to offer
much of an obstacle to a well equipped force. It
was by this road that Colonel Lumsden'a Mission in
1857 advanced, the Khyber Pass being closed, owing
to the hostility of the Shinwarri and Zaki-Kheyl
Afridis. Leaving Peshawur on the 13th of March,
1857, the Mission reached Kohat the following
day ; here it halted until the 16th, and then, pass
ing tlttough Khwaja-Khizr, Hungoo, Khai, and
i arsawand, reached Thall on the 20th. Crossing
the Afghan frontier the following day, the party
marched by way of Boghzai Saddah to Mahomed
Azim's Fort, which by road is just 51 miles. The
country around is described as being most fertile ;
splendid groves of mulberry and plane trees
greet the eye ; but its unhealthiness is enhanced by
rice swamps, which abound along the river banks.
The fort in those days occupied a large extent of
surface, possessed eight bastions, each of which
was surmounted by a round tower, and was sur
rounded by a wide ditch and covered way. The
entrance-gate is at the south-east bastion over a
drawbridge that moves on solid wooden wheels.
The interior space of the fort is for the most part
covered by an irregular and dense mass of build
ings that resemble a small town. For four days
Colonel Lurasden was compelled to halt at this
spot owing to the hostility of the Jajis, a very
powerful and warlike tribe who dwell on the slopes
of the Paiwar Mountain, and who probably will
cause trouble to this force ; the eight of an
extensive baggage-train, such as must neces
sarily accompany a column of invasion, will excite
their cupidity and may be the cause of harassing
skirmishing for rear and flanking guards. Leaving
Koorum Fort, the road passes through Habit Kila,
16 miles ; Ali-Khail, 18 miles ; Rokian, six
miles ; Hazrah, 20 miles; Khushi, 18 miles ;
Hisarak, 10 miles ; Tangi- Wardak, 18 miles •
Haedar Khail, 12 miles. Here a road branches off
to Cabul; then halting at Swara, 15 miles, Ghuznee
is reached after a long march of 22 miles. This ex
pedition thus covered the 240 miles between Kohat
and Ghuznee in 17 marches ; but it is improbable
that an army encumbered with guns and baggage
would average more than 10 miles ner diem, more
especially as in many parts, notably from Mahomed
Azim s 1 ort to Tangi-Wardak, the road is over
| very mountainous country, quite impracticable at
j present for guns. This defect, however, is one of
easy remedy ; there are few better road-makers in
the world than Hazarah labourers. A large number
of them were formed into a species of irregular
engineer brigade in the Black Mountain Expedi
tion of 1868, and they, in a very few days, under 1
European supervision, constructed an admirable j
gun road to the crest of the Muchai Peak, an alti
tude of 10,200ft. above sea level. There is no I
doubt the^ will be extensively employed should !
opportunities arise.
It is probable that the 6,000 men com
posing the central column will be furnished from
the frontier stations of Kohat, 68 miles from
Thall, the point of concentration, Edwardesabad
42 miles, Dera-Ismail-Khan 165. The garrison of
these places is purely native—if we except one com
pany of the 70th Foot in Fort Akalgarh, near the
last-named station—and consists of three mountain 1
batteries, three regiments of native cavalry, and
seven of native infantry. Rawul Pindee, with its
mixed British and native garrison of one Hussar
| and two Line Regiments, one battery of Horse and
' one of Field Artillery, one regiment of native cavalry
and two of native infantry, is 16 marches from
Thall. The River Indus, across which a bridge of
boats is thrown in the winter months, intervenes at
Kushalgarh. Jhelum, with one cavalry and two
native infantry battalions,, is six marches fur
ther, so that it is quite possible for these 6,000
men to be at Thall by the middle of Octo
ber. _ The feasibility of an advance into Af
ghanistan at that late period of the year is
open to question ; the advantage to be gained by
pushing into a country, with a fanatical popula
tion, and with every prospect of our troops being
completely isolated from their supports for a
certain six months, is still more doubtful ; for it
must be remembered that communications with
Cabul are absolutely cut off during the winter
season, the passes are covered with snow and quite
impassable for traffic.
Having discussed in detail the Khyber and the
Koorum Passes, it may be well to glance briefly at
the Goomul or Gwaleyree route, which runs from
Dera-Ismail-Khan to Ghuznee, with a branch to
I Candahar. It is true there are other roads between
i the Koorum and the Goomul, notably one through
the Dawar Valley and Khost ; but as they have
never been traversed by any European and the in
formation concerning them is meagre and untrust
worthy it is not probable that they would be utilized
for the passage of an expeditionary force, however
valuable they might become subsequent to an in
vasion for the transit of convoys and reliefs.
The drawback to the Goomul Pass is the fact
that Tank, the point of ingress, is far distant from
any railway, and that the road from Chicha Wutnee,
the nearest station (midway between Mooltan and:
Lahore) lies across a desert, with very little
; water and still less forage for the use of a force
marching across the sandy tract which intervenes
between the rail and the Indus. Moreover, the
river at Jhung is not bridged and the passage of
troops would be considerably delayed by the Want
i of suitable ferry boats. From Chicha Wutnee to
1 Dera-lsmail-Khan is about 18 marches, and on to
Tank three more. The entrance to the pass is at a
small village called Mortaza, some 16 miles west ;
the road thence follows the course of the Goomul
stream to a place called Orzuk, a distance of eight
days' march. Here two routes branch off west
ward ; the northernmost, skirting the Mahsood
Vaziri country, reaches Ghuznee in 16 more days ;
the southern one taking 18 marches before Can
dahar is made. There is abundance of water on
both roads ; forage, however, is scarce, and the
Vaziri thieves, who infest the pass in gangs of con
siderable strength, offer serious obstacles to the
transit of the caravans of Afghan merchants. Our
endeavour to coerce this tribe in 1860 shows the
formidable nature of the resistance they could
offer, for in the expedition against them, under Sir
Neville Chamberlain, we sustained a loss of 90
killed and 262 wounded, and even then their
hatred of us as neighbours was not subdued, as
the frontier has been in a continual state of turmoil
owing to their frequent and unpunished raids. The
history of the relations between the Mahsood
Vaziris and the British Government is an ex
traordinary medley of unbounded effrontery on
the one hand, of the most long-suffering
patience on the other. Thus, in addition to the
difficulty of massing troops at the entrance of the
Goomul Pass, we may certainly count on deter
mined opposition to the passage of any force through
the Vaziri territory.
It is unlikely that any attempt would be made
to make use of the numerous small passes that in
tervene between the Goomul and the Bolan. That
pass is well known not only on account of its being