'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎14r] (27/248)

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 25
ON BAGHDAD.
are discussed by the Government, the Prime Minister summoned a special Inter-Depart
mental Committee, composed of members of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , the War Office, the Admiralty
and the Foreign Office, to which he submitted certain questions on the subject of the strate
gical situation in Mesopotamia. Mr. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India, had some
doubts as to whether he or Sir Thomas Holderness should be Chairman of this Committee,
but he finally decided in favour of Sir Thomas Holderness in the belief that the other
members of the Committee would more freely express their opinions before an Under
secretary than a Secretary of State. Sir Thomas Holderness, though a distinguished
civilian, had no special experience or training in the class of questions submitted to the
Committee. The other members of the Committee were
Sir Edmund Barrow, Military Secretary, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, Admiralty.
Sir Louis Mallet, Foreign Office.
Mr. Launcelot Oliphant, Foreign Office.
Colonel Talbot, War Office.
Captain Paddon, War Office.
22 . The case was one of such high importance that, in our opinion, the Representatives
of the War Office and the Admiralty on the Committee should have been officers of official
position and experience more nearly on a par with those of Sir E. Barrow, who was the
Senior General of the Indian Army and also Head of the Military Department of the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. . During their discussions, the question of transport, as we ascertained from
Sir Thomas Holderness, became quite a subsidiary subject. There were three communi
cations from Mesopotamia—one contained in a despatch and memorandum, dated 10 th
July, 1915, and two in telegrams dated respectively 25th September, 1915, and 9th October,*
1915, which unmistakably expressed the inadequacy of the river transport even for the
wants of the existing force of two divisions. These documents, though received at the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , were either unknown to the Committee or, if they were brought before them,
were not seriously considered. Sir Thomas Holderness told us that his apprehensions as
regards transport were largely removed by General Nixon’s telegram of the 5th October,|
stating that “ by marching the troops with land transport and by lightening the vessels
and employing them to tow loaded barges, we have overcome the difficulties of navigation.”
He did not appreciate the limitations of this assurance, and thought it applied to the general
question of adequate river transport. After discussing the definite questions put to them,
Sir Thomas Holderncss’s Committee came to the conclusion that, on both political and
military grounds, the occupation of Baghdad was most desirable if the necessary reinforce
ments could be assured. Failing these, General Nixon was not to attempt it.
23. It was the promise of reinforcements that alone induced this Committee to advocate
an advance to Baghdad, but, as in the case of the other authorities consulted, they ap
parently passed over the all-important problem of how these reinforcements, after arrival
at Basra, were to be conveyed as fighting units to the front, a distance of some 500 miles. ;
We lay stress upon this serious omission, especially in the case of the Committee presided
over by Sir Thomas Holderness. The despatch of troops from France or Egypt could not
affect any fighting around Baghdad after its capture, unless, after their arrival in Meso
potamia, they were conveyed as an organised force to the scene of action. The arrival
of troops at Basra, without transport or their proper medical complement, with their
Headquarter Staff scattered and disorganised and without the means of conveyance up
the river, was not a reinforcement in the sense defined by the Viceroy in his private telegram
of the 9th of October, in which he thus expressed himself :—
We may add that the reinforcing troops should reach Baghdad not later than one month after
the capture of that city, and this is the period which we calculate must elapse before the Turks could
concentrate in strength to attempt its recapture.
24. It seems to us that it should have been a primary duty of the Military Advisers
of the Government, both in India and in England, to have thoroughly investigated the
conditions attending the dispatch of troops from Europe and Egypt and their transport
up the Tigris, so as to be sure that they could perform the functions assigned to them of
being a fighting addition to the advance columns located in Baghdad.
In this connection it should be noted that Sir Beauchamp Duff, in his examination
before the Commission placed the same interpretation as did Sir Thomas Holderness,
upon the telegram of General Nixon of the 5 thf of October, in which he used the words:
“ We have overcome the difficulties of Navigation.”
* See Part IX., paras. 8 and 10. f See paragraph 12, nnfe.
(C 48—17C)
D