'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎76v] (157/294)

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For coiranunicating from air to ground aircraft relied chiefly upon
message dropping. The use of wireless had serious disadvantages.
bombers were equipped with the r i.21 set v/hich had a trailing aerial and
which necessitated the employment of an air gunner who was a 7//T
operator. To use its T//T a light bomber had to break off action to
climb and wind out an aerial v/hich trailed some 250 feet below and
which of course had to be wound in again before the action could be
resumed. Such interruption v/as particularly serious v/hen the aircraft
was endeavouring to assist troops by pinning the enemy. Army co-opera
tion aircraft had the T.R.2. set for both R/T and ’J/T purposes. Being
fitted with a frame aerial, it was freed from the disadvantages of the
bomber’s wireless and moreover did not require a W/T operator to work it
On the other hand it lacked range and reliability, and the R/T tenders
with which A.C. Squadrons were equipped did not give satisfactory results
due chiefly to their age. ,
L iaison between troops and air c raft crew s
This question has already been touched upon in the previous chapter,
It v/as largely a matter of good telephonic communications, v/hich in
Palestine were far from satisfactory, and an adequate lay-out of landing
grounds. One Air Liaison Section only v/as available, and was stationed
at Ramleh which was by far the most important air base. The work of the
Air Liaison Section became all the more important since the air bases
were in most cases some distance from the military area headquarters
with which they were working. This made personal contact between
commanders and aircraft crews difficult; and in spite of the liberal
provision of landing grounds it v/as often impossible for aircraft to
land near the headquarters of detachments in the field. In the case of
pre-arranged operations it v/as usually possible for squadron and flight
commanders to attend a military conference, or at least to visit the
commander, and this personal contact was of very great value on all
occasions. The chief difficulty however was to get sufficient informa
tion to the pilot before he went into the air for a quick action such
o.s that resulting from an XX call. The best solution was to ensure
tnat the Air Liaison Section, or the commander of the air base, was kept
continually up to date with a regular flow of military information, so
tna. aircraft crews might have a chance of knowing at least the latest
news of the general situation before going into the air.
iraining in combined ope rations
Perhaps the best way of all to arrange good liaison between troops
vT n 1 ^ r + ft . CreWS WaS t0 P rovide practice in working together.
r S x a i S ° rec l uired to accustom troops and pilots to the
c Vil Q e as ^ VT;rounc i Code and other means of intercommunication,
the rli + aGn opportunity of learning the methods and
mate the h SS S . ^ aCil 0 ^ Iier * _ Pilots were sometimes apt to underesti-
tryino- countrv ac ^ don o1, infantry in moving across very
temporarilv driv°n ^ in great neat > t 0 d eal with enemy who had been
« .r^sss‘"5 rn- «“*«» -
impossible in exnaa s oion o. the troops made such action
S the R A-P bih i k lana militar y commanders often left too much
followed urfbv aot .. a PP«ciate that unless air action was
recovered - to say notS^kf'the S1 ™ Wltiori 31111 wounded would not be
in the followin'-up process f^ra casualties tho - t mi 3ht be inflicted
avoid these misAdersWink • “k 3 tog ' 2thtir did rauch to
encouragement tn innn ° ’ ana in P ar iicular gave much-needed
experience of adkaction^o °°™ anaers ’ who had ha d little previous
they were inclined to do’a^ first ^Thcrr 1 ^ mUCh . more fre ® ly th&n
record in which co-operation w, ’ h < : an be few operations on
otween aircraft and small military