'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎50v] (105/454)

80 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
* Known as Force ” A.”
f Known as Force " B.”
comment, not lessened by the fact that a failure to despatch
the crop would affect the pockets of many of the Arab chiefs
and local notables. Earlier in the month, the Foreign Office
had issued a warning to British ships to avoid Turkish waters
and ports ; there had been a misunderstanding as to the extent
that ships proceeding up the Shatt al Arab could be covered
by war insurance ; the reports regarding mines and the in
tention of the Turks to block the fairway had acted as a further
deterrent; and the British India Steamship Navigation Com
pany had been obliged by the demands for shipping in other
directions to take most of their regular ships off the run.
On the 29th, Admiral Slade urged on the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. that
troops should be despatched as suggested by the Admiralty
for the protection of the oil works at Abadan, to which
they attached great importance ; and on the 1 st September,
the Viceroy telegraphed Home expressing doubts as to the
sufficiency of our naval strength in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . The next
day the Political Secretary at the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , Sir A. Hirtzel,
raised the whole question on political grounds. He wrote
“ though it may be true that, so far as Turkey’s power of offence
in Europe is concerned, we can safely leave her till a later stage
in the war .... in the meantime the political effect in
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and in India of leaving the head of the Gulf
derelict will be disastrous, and we cannot afford, politically,
to acquiesce in such a thing for an indefinite period while the
main issues are being settled elsewhere. From the military point
of view a Turkish diversion in that region is doubtless negligible
—though under German officers it may not be wholly ineffec
tive : but it will be worked for all it is worth for the sake of the
political effect which the Turks and Germans hope to produce
through it on Moslem feeling in India. Moreover ....
we cannot begin by sacrificing the Shaikh of Kuwait.”
In minuting on the above, General Barrow pointed out how
the Turkish menace had altered the military problem, as far
as India was concerned; and he continued: “That problem
resolves itself into the extent to which we can employ Indian
troops outside India with a due regard to the defence of
India and the direction in which these troops can best be
utilised. The Government of India have concurred in the
employment of:—
(а) Three infantry and one cavalry divisions in Europe*
( б ) A force consisting of a mixed regular brigade and of
Imperial Service troops in East Africa.f