Publications, Newspaper Cuttings, Photographs and Correspondence about Persia and the Persian Gulf [‎354v] (713/879)

— — .. ---o-g foreign
Office to nominate regularly constituted Con
sular officers to Bushire and Ispahan ; but that
M. de Giers is simply carrying into execution a
diplomatic plan of action determined upon long
ago.
Russian action in Asia is guided and con
trolled on the lines of a well-devised and
definite policy; it works on a plan em
bracing a project of the most gigantic ambi
tion, which, had it been declared at the mo
ment of its inception, would have secured
against it such unanimous and concentrated
opposition from other Powers as to have
rendered it impossible of realisation. The
policy of the Czar's Government is neither
opportunist nor experimental: Russia steadily
pursues her definite aims, regardless of outside
influences. Her energy, however, is not always
uniform. Her efforts at times may appear
non-existent owing to the low pressure exer
cised, whilst at other times they are in
action with explosive force. Russia really
works on a secret programme framed on a
basis of unlimited ambition. Her executive
never swerves from that programme; but
though persistent, it acts with patience, “biding
its time, content to wait for years, until a
favourable opportunity occurs for putting into
execution a long matured and thoroughly
thought out plan. How different is this from
our spasmodic policy dependent on the peculiar
phase of temper our good British proletariat
may happen to be in for the time being.
Let us now follow the effects of Russian policy
in Persia since the time when that country
entered upon a new lease of life and joined the
“ concert of nations,” in 1862, when the tele
graph line was first erected in the Shah's domi
nions by the late Colonel Patrick Stewart. We
had then a diplomatic and consular establish
ment consisting of the Legation at Teheran, the
Resident at • Bushire, a Consul-General at
Tabriz, and Consular Agents at Resht, Hama
dan, Ispahan, Shiraz, Mashad and Astrabad.
These Consular Agents were Persians, with the
exception of Aga Nur, an Armenian, at Ispahan.
At the same epoch the Russians had their
Legation at Teheran, a Consul-General at Tabriz,
a Consul at Resht and another at Astrabad.
They had no other accredited Agents. The
post from England arrived at Teheran once a
month and from India once in six weeks. In
ternal postal communication was by horse-post
and by foot-runners, so that it took
ten days or a fortnight to send a despatch
from Bushire to Teheran. With the advent
of the telegraph and its staff of about
forty Englishmen, and the facilities it afforded
for rapid communication of news, political
matters which had long lain dormant in true
Oriental style, were stirred up afresh. Eng
land determined to define the boundaries of
Afghanistan to the west, and the labours of the
Seistan Mission were hardly finished, when
the counter-move of Russia, by announcing the
absorption of Khiva into the Russian empire,
showed she was not going to let the opportu
nity slip of extending her territory. Moreover,
while negotiations regarding the Afghan boun
dary were in progress in 1871 the Russians
were, unknown to Sir Charles Alison and the
British Legation, obtaining from Mirza Said
Khan, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the cession of all territory on the east of the
Caspian up to the Attrek River. Surprise
and indignation were expressed at what
was called the spoliation of Persia, but it is
only fair to remember that Persian claims to
territory north of the Attrek were as shadowy
as her claims to the country beyond Rudbar
on the Helmand, which the British Govern
ment disallowed. The next expression of acti-
—amin. - This
gency was answered
amraussia by the appointment of
.nsul-General at Mashad, and now comes
the nomination of Russian Consuls at Ispahan
and Bushire.
It must not be supposed that because Russia
had no Consul or “ Vakil Elected representative or attorney, acting in legal matters such as contracting marriage, inheritance, or business; a high-ranking legal official; could also refer to a custodian or administrator. -i-doivlah " at Ispahan,
Shiraz, Bushire, or other places, therefore she
was not minutely informed of all that was going
on. Persia has for a long time past been
overrun by unaccredited Russian Agents, and
only now has she thought fit openly to
declare that her interests in Persia are such
that Consuls are indispensable. The only won
der is that the Russians did not years ago
appoint recognised Consular officials broadcast
over the country. There was nothing to pre-’
vent it. British remonstrance would have been
useless and indeed unwarranted. Russia has at
Astrakan on the Volga, at Baku and Tiflis a very
considerable population of Persians : Russian
subjects, yet having relations and property in
Persia. Besides this at Tiflis and Baku certain
classes of workmen, notably bricklayers, are
almost entirely Persians, true subjects of the
Shah, who come and go, attracted by the
high wages they obtain. The Shah has
Consular representatives at Tiflis and Baku,
"so he could hardly refuse to receive repre
sentatives of the Czar’s Government at such
a place as Julfu of Ispahan, whose Chris-
tian orthodox Armenian inhabitants have
for many years been under Russian pro
tection, similar to that extended by France to
the Roman Catholic Armenians resident there.
There is nothing, then, very alarming about
these new Consular appointments. They are
merely an open avowal of a policy that has
hitherto been carried out by secret means, the |
result not improbably of our renewed activity
in Persia, diplomatically by the nomination of a .
Consul at Ispahan and a Consul-General at
Mashad, and commercially by the establish
ment of banks in Teheran and the Karun con
cession.
It cannot be doubted, however, that when
Nasiruddin Shah ends his days, Persia will be
come the theatre of Russian activity on an ex
tensive scale. The Shah is advancing in years ;
and has, it is said, obtained a promise from the
Czar that his country and its institutions would
be respected during his lifetime. ' But on his
decease internal troubles are not unlikely to
arise. It is quite on the cards such may be pro
voked by Russian’agents, and then seized upon as
a pretext for active interference. It is possible
hat the establishment of new Consuls and
commercial agents may be with a view to
such eventualities. What form Russian inter
ference may assume it is impossible to predicate.
The presence of a division of the Caucasus
army at Tabriz, of another at Teheran, and of
a third at Mashad would be warranted outward
ly by the necessity for maintaining order and
protecting the lives of Europeans—Englishmen
included—and practically a protectorate over
Persia might be thus established without its
being diplomatically proclaimed, as in our case
with respect to Afghanistan. Afghanistan
being accredited to no other Power except our
selves, stands, howev r, on a different footing
to Persia, which is accredited diplomatically to
Russia, England, France, Germany, Italy, ;
Turkey and America. All these Powers would
have something to say to an arbitrary pro
tectorate over Persia proclaimed by Russia on
the Shah’s death
But we can conceive a state of anarchy and
disorder, rapine and plunder stirred up
secretly and fomented by skilful agents, which
would cause the march of 30,000 Russians into
Northern Persia to be looked upon as a deliver
ance by the peaceful portion of the popu
lation. How could England remonstrate ?
Evidently we should not be in the position
to maintain internal peace and order in Persia,
whatever we might do in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
form It into a naval station, Masarr.
one time occupied as a British telegraph stat—
with the concurrence of the Ruler of Muscat,
until a move was made to the Island of Henjam.
The narrowness of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. at its en
trance, about 25 miles, justifies the selection of
Masandam as a naval station of strategic import
ance. If Russia by our action distinctly realises
that we shall oppose her advance to the Persian
Gulf, she will in all probability confine her
energies to Northern Persia when the time for
movement into the Shah’s dominions comes.
Unless she can see an outlet for her commerce
and a future naval station for her fleet in the
Gulf, she will have no object in advancing south
l40
or
amng
its time, content to wait for years, until a
favourable opportunity occurs for putting into
execution a long matured and thoroughly
thought out plan. How different is this from
our spasmodic policy dependent on the peculiar
phase of temper our good British proletariat
may happen to be in for the time being.
Let us now follow the effects of Russian policy
in Persia since the time when that country
entered upon a new lease of life and joined the
“ concert of nations,” in 1862, when the tele
graph line was first erected in the Shah’s domi
nions by the late Colonel Patrick Stewart. We
had then a diplomatic and consular establish
ment consisting of the Legation at Teheran, the
Resident at Bushire, a Consul-General at
Tabriz, and Consular Agents at Resht, Hama
dan, Ispahan, Shiraz, Mashad and Astrabad.
These Consular Agents were Persians, with the
exception of Aga Nur, an Armenian, at Ispahan.
At the same epoch the Russians had their
Legation at Teheran, a Consul-General at Tabriz,
a Consul at Resht and another at Astrabad.
They had no other accredited Agents. The
post from England arrived at Teheran once a
month and from India once in six weeks. In
ternal postal communication was by horse-post
ten days or a fortnight to send
from Bushire to Teheran. With
of the telegraph and its staff
it took
a despatch
the advent
of about
forty Englishmen, and the facilities it afforded
for rapid communication of news, political
matters which had long lain dormant in true
Oriental style, were stirred up afresh. Eng
land determined to define the boundaries of
Afghanistan to the west, and the labours of the
Seistan Mission were hardly finished, when
the counter-move of Russia, by announcing the
absorption of Khiva into the Russian empire,
showed she was not going to let the opportu
nity slip of extending her territory. Moreover,
while negotiations regarding the Afghan boun- “Turkey and America.
dary were in progress in 1871 the Russians
were, unknown to Sir Charles Alison and the
British Legation, obtaining from Mirza Said
Khan, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the cession of all territory on the east of the
Caspian up to the Attrek River. Surprise
and indignation were expressed at what
was called the spoliation of Persia, but it is
only fair to remember that Persian claims to
territory north of the Attrek were as shadowy
as her claims to the country beyond Rudbar
on the Helmand, which the British Govern
ment disallowed. The next expression of acti-
aplace—as 9 tl 11 u of Ispaha n, whose Chris-"
tian orthodox Armenian inhabitants have
for many years been under Russian pro
tection, similar to that extended by France to '
the Roman Catholic Armenians resident there.
There is nothing, then, very alarming about "
these new Consular appointments. They are
merely an open avowal of a policy that has
hitherto been carried out by secret means, the
result not improbably of our renewed activity
in Persia, diplomatically by the nomination of a
Consul at Ispahan and a Consul-General at
I
Mashad, and commercially by the establish- •
ment of banks in Teheran and the Karun con
cession.
It cannot be doubted, however, that when
*
1
Nasiruddin Shah ends his days, Persia will be." 19
come the theatre of Russian activity on an ex- k
tensive scale. The Shah is advancing in years ;
and has, it is said, obtained a promise from the
Czar that his country and its institutions would
be respected during his lifetime. But on his
decease internal troubles are not unlikely to
arise. It is quite on the cards such may be pro
voked by Russian’agents, and then seized upon as
a pretext for active interference. It is possible
hat the establishment of new Consuls and
commercial agents may be with a view to
such eventualities. What form Russian inter
ference may assume it is impossible to predicate.
The presence of a division of the Caucasus
army at Tabriz, of another at Teheran, and of
a third at Mashad would be warranted outward
ly by the necessity for maintaining order and
protecting the lives of Europeans—Englishmen
included—and practically a protectorate over
Persia might be thus established without its
being diplomatically proclaimed, as in our case
with respect to Afghanistan. Afghanistan
being accredited to no other Power except our
selves, stands, however, on a different footing
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jd
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co
to Persia, which is accredited diplomatically to
Russia, England, France, Germany, Italy,
All these Powers would
have something to say to an arbitrary pro
tectorate over Persia proclaimed by Russia on
the Shah’s death
But we can conceive a state of anarchy and
disorder, rapine and plunder stirred up
secretly and fomented by skilful agents, which
would cause the march of 30,000 Russians into
Northern Persia to be looked upon as a deliver
ance by the peaceful portion of the popu
lation. How could England remonstrate ?
Evidently we should not be in the position
to maintain internal peace and order in Persia,
whatever we might do in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,