'B 299. Mesopotamia. Note on Demobilisation by Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.' [‎2r] (3/8)

AdmimstraUve Considerations.
]0. ll the assumptions in the foregoing paragraph represent to anv de^iee- the ^
probable line of policy to be pursued by Government, it follows that the efficiency
of the means of transportation and communication in Mesopotamia will be, no less
than the size and composition of the garrison, a matter of Imperial concern; and it
will be necessary, when discussing post-war administration, to provide for the
retention of effective Government control over the means of transportation developed
by military agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. in this country during the present war, and for their further
development with due regard to strategical requirements. . .
Thus when the Civil Administration is called on to take over the existing
Directorate of Railways it should do so not as a domestic matter but on behalf ol th(
Imperial Government; it should be required to keep such reserves of material as
may be decided on, and to build such additional lines and sidings as are needed lor
military purposes. . „
In consideration of these obligations being fulfilled the railway lines, rolling
stock and other assets might be handed over to the Civil Administration at a lowei
rate than would otherwise be the case.
I am assuming that in the case of railways, works, power plant and other assets
of the kind erected in the country and required for post-war purposes, they will be
assessed and handed over at a valuation to the Civil Administration, which will hand
to the Treasury an equivalent of Mesopotamian Bonds in lieu, the interest and
sinking fund on which will be payable annually. ^
It is abundantly clear that ii this country is to be given a good stait, all these
assets should be handed over to it. „ . i i i
It would pay the Imperial Government, as a matter ol business, to hand them
over for one quarter of their book value, for the cost of dismantling the partly used
plant, shipping it, storing it and reassembling it, will be very great, and will involve
further deterioration; and meanwhile the plant will not be earning money and all
the monev spent in preparing sites, foundations, embankments, accommodation, &(*.,
will be lost. Left in situ in working order, there is little doubt that it will earn
enough to pay working expenses, interest and sinking fund on a reduced estimate ol
capital value.
11. If the above assumptions are correct, no railway material will be returned to
India, and the demobilisation of railway staff would consist of the transfer to the
-Civil Administration cf the Directorate, and the continuance in civil employ of
all men willing to remain. The Railway Directorate would have to continue to
recruit staff from India and probably from Europe for some time to come.
Directorate of Telegraphs.
12. The considerations advanced in paragraphs 10 and 11 mutatis mutandis
to telegraphs. This Directorate is already quasi-civil; it is at present staffed and
administered from India ; it is a matter for consideration of Government whether it
should not be amalgamated with the Indo-European Telegraph Department^ and
o-iven by international arrangement powers to run a line ol telegraphs from Baghdad
to the Mediterranean, thus connecting India with the United Kingdom more effectively
than was possible through Russia and across Europe.
The powerful wireless installations at Basrah and Baghdad would be taken over
by this Directorate; the numerous smaller installations being stored in Baghdad, as a
strategic reserve, on the principles advocated in paragraphs 5 and G supra.
A Telegraph Department with effective control over main lines of communication
up the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and Mesopotamia would be a great Imperial asset; commercially
it would probably, like the Indo -European lelegraph Depaitment, pay.
Inland Water Transport.
13. Until there is through communication between Amarah and Baghdad by rail
a considerable volume of military river-borne traffic will be required, but railway
communication once effected it seems unlikely that the Iigiis will be used to aii\
great extent bv Government lor the transport ol troops oi mateual, except peihaps
fuel oil and bulk kerosene, coal, and, in times of high river, railway and building
materials.