'File 60/20 I (C 93) Imperial Bank of Iran: Bahrain, etc' [‎68v] (138/409)

an unreasonable demand; the National Bank were enabled by the Government action
to make a profit, but at the expense of the Persian Government. The Imperial Bank,
however, if they followed his Highness's advice, were bound to m ak e ^ loss at the
expense of their shareholders. Yes, said Teymourtache, that is the difficulty; how
can the Imperial Bank at the same time serve the interests of Persian trade and also
01 their hness was the wish of the Persian Government to force
the Imperial Bank to clear out of Persia. He said certainly not but he was not
prepared to modify the present policy whereby the Imperial Bank had to hold at
the disposal of the Government 50 per cent, of the exchange they bought.
8 As a complete deadlock had been reached, I changed the subject. Later on,
before leaving, I reverted to the question. I said it seemed to me hopeless to expect
a satisfactory arrangement to be made direct between the representatives of the
Imperial Bank and Dr. Lindenblatt. I asked him to treat what I was now going
to sav as entirely personal and confidential. I said that I had the impression that
Dr. Lindenblatt was animated by such strong feelings against the Imperial Bank
that his main object was to drive the bank out of Persia. I did not believe that he
was really considering the best interests of Persian trade,^ in addition to his animus
against the Imperial Bank I believed that he had no love lor the English and looked
forward as a patriotic German, not merely to driving out the Imperial Bank with its
English employees, but to bringing in more and more Germans to control the
economic position in Persia. If I was right in this surmise, it was obviously hopeless
to expect an agreement between Dr. Lindenblatt and Mr. Rogers and Mr. Wilkinson.
I again repeated that the Imperial Bank were ready to co-operate with the Persian
Government to assist Persian trade, but how was this to be done? Teymourtache
said : "I have two alternatives to suggest. We could arrange a meeting at which
you and I would be present, together with Lindenblatt, Rogers and Wilkinson." I
said that I personally had no competence in banking matters. " No more have I,"
said Teymourtache, "but you and I might add a little common sense to the
proceedings." . j
9. " The other alternative is that I should see Rogers and Wilkinson together;
which do you prefer ?" I said I thought the best would be, in the first instance, at
any rate, if he would receive Messrs. Rogers and Wilkinson, and I hoped he would
endeavour to understand the bank point of view. He agreed to do this, and asked
me to arrange for these two gentlemen to come and see him on Monday afternoon,
the 14th, at 4 o'clock.
10. On the 14tlh April, before Mr. Rogers and Mr. Wilkinson went to see him, I
decided to send to his Highness a personal letter, of which a copy is herewith
enclosed. The object of this letter, which only in part relates to the Imperial Bank,
was to draw the serious attention of his Highness to tlhe generally unsatisfactory
attitude of the Persian Government. In the part of the letter which relates to the
bank I endeavoured to warn the Minister that the present treatment of the Imperial
Bank of Persia could but react in the long run to the disadvantage of the Persian
Government. The facts were bound to come out, and if a British concern, which had
invested money in Persia and had on the whole served the Persian Government and
Persian people well for the past forty years, were to be treated in this way, he would
look in vain if he wished at some later date to obtain British capital for industrial
development in this country.
11. As I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 93 of the 16th April
Teymourtache received Mr. Rogers and Mr. Wilkinson very politely on the 14th, and,
in the course of a long discussion, handed them a draft, of which copy is enclosed,*
of a revised bank concession. It came out in this conversation that Dr. Lindenblatt
had, in fact, offered to buy out the Imperial Bank. Teymourtache said that this
was entirely without his authority, and he expressed his annoyance at
Dr. Lindenblatt's action.
12. When I saw his Highness the following day, he referred to my personal
letter and to wfoat I had said about injury to Persian credit if the Persian Govern
ment persisted in their present attitude; lie said that Persia did not wish to borrow
any money at the present time, and, therefore, the question of their international
credit had no practical importance. Such foolish remarks on the part of his
Highness I am not inclined to take seriously. I had, on the contrary, the impression
that his Highness was beginning more and more to realise that there was something
wrong with his present economic policy which was merely having the effect of
paralysing Persian trade and causing general irritation in the country. No one
* Not printed.