'Administration of Mesopotamia' [‎95v] (2/4)

o
a hoinoo-eneons adminiBtration in all practical aspects is not in any way
'incomp .-Ttible with a technical difference of political status, and that it is
r<*cntial in the interest* of the country that the administration of both
vilaijets should he uniform, that of the Basra Vilayet being brought into line
with Basra in due course."
- i n v i ew 0 f the above passage, Captain Wilson seems to be justified in claiming
ft le^rani Xo 77-0 of loth September) that his decision to combine the administration
of the* t.vo vilayets under a single headquarters office at Baghdad is " in conformity
with the .venoral instructions given by the Eastern Committee " to Sir P. Cox,
provided it is understood that, where differences of sytem exist, Basra methods must
)„> assimilated to those of Baghdad, and not vice versa. There is force in the Civil
Commissiorier's contention that the " maintenance of an artificial distinction, where
" in reolitij none exists} would necessarily involve some lack of co-ordination." That
the distinction is a purely artificial one was pointed out by Sir P. Cox as long ago as
the 7th April 1917. He then telegraphed
" f irA convinced . . . that no attempt to differentiate fundamentally in
regard to working principles and details of the two administrations will
produce satisfactory results, and that they should be so similar as to be
indistinguishable in the working. The difference would be one of technical
political status and nomenclature which need not make itself felt on the
spot. To attempt to run the two vilayets, nhich are from every point of
view insejiarahlc, on conflicting lines and inconsistent pimciples would,
I am sure, result in great prejudice to all interests concerned."
Up to a comparatively recent period there was this practical point ol difference
between the two vilayets, that Baghdad was still a. war area, whereas Basra was
beino- administered under what were, to all intents and purposes, peace conditions.
To-day, as Captain Wilson intimates, this distinction hr.s largely disappeared;
and recent events have rendered its reappearance in the highest degree
improbable. There remains the question of the post-war settlement. Will the
ultimate differentiation of status between the two vilayets—supposing tins lorms
part of the settlement—be prejudiced by uniiorm administration during me pei lod
of military occupation? In 1917 it was iearcd that this might be ilio ease. Bat
Sir P. Cox, speaking from more than a year's experience of the actual administration
of the two'vilayets, is evidently of opinion that the fear was groundless. His views
having been generally adopted by His Majesty s Ciovernment, we need not c.txi at ^ u
steps taken, primarily on grounds of administrative convenience, to cam them into
effect.
G. Captain Wilson has revived the question oi a Commission jrom Ijnyland at
what seems to the Department a rather opportune moment. Last year the proposal
Avas dropped because of the likelihood, as it then appeared, that serious militai}
. operations would take place during the winter season. No swell likelihood exists
now. Moreover, the prospect of peace discussions has been brought within measurame
distance by the events of the last few weeks. We may find ourselves, much sooner t han
Ave expected,called upon to argue and justify our Mesopotamian case. W e shall plain!)
be in a position to do so with much greater effect if we have a considered and
coherent policy to place before the world. It is true that the Ciovernment ol India (who
have criticised adversely several of Captain Wilson's recent recommendations) rcgaid
the proposal as " altogether premature," and consider that "no useful purpose would
be served by the despatch of a Commission at the present stage. But then
criticism appears to be directed rather against the choice of subjects lor investigation
b} the i ommission than against the principle of the Commission itself. W hat seems
to be required is, jiot to tie down the Commission to particular lines ol enquiry, but
to give them a free hand to examine and report, in consultation with the local
aut lonties, on the wider aspects of administrative policy in the occupied territories,
e want to fonu a clearer idea in our own minds as to the main lines on which we
10 rV- a c l ear " cll t programme will not only hamper us at the
()U 5 nrm " e i lt already hampering us in regard to a numbei s ol practical
recemlv^ulmUt^ 1 )^!' ' 10 [ n ^ to take 11 iew samples: proposals
Britisli Tm i . m <n ^niprovemeut of banking facilities in Mesopotamia ; the
e orpoiation has raised the question of sending out an unollicial
ll'Xt (.[ tllP . | ... ,i . . i
s ' l(u cor ^pt in tliis passage, but the sense appears to be as given heie.