Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎57r] (117/312)

general view is tliat he will figlit, as he cannot but
regard our thi'eaJening preparations as a menace to
his independence. He will resort to this dangerous
course simply because he is too proud to adopt any
other, and not because he anticipates that he can
emerge from the struggle in any other way than as
the vanquished. Instead of acquiring prudence by
! past misfortune, he is supposed to have become
I more audacious and less calculating. He can only
| expect from Russia such assistance as was vouch
safed to Servia, while he fills the position of a dis
united Servia opposed to a Turkey of overwhelming
strength. The result of a war with England must
be political extinction, and the overthrow can only
be of the most complete kind. Yet we by no
means deny that there is much to be advanced
in favour of the view that S here A u ,
despite odds, superior weapons, and other tactical
deficiencies, will not budge an.inch from the defiant ,
position he his assumed.
, In any case there can be no doubt that such is |
the proper view our authorities should take of the |
crisis, upon which our well-informed Correspon- !
dent " Anglo-Indian " makes some significant com- j
ments in the letter we publish from him this
morning. There can be no doubt of the gravity of
the crisis, and a sentence from Mr. L owe's paper
on Imperialism in the current Fortnightly Review
sums up with striking terseness the position we
hold in India. He says, " We had a wolf by the
ears, which it was as difficult to let go as to hold.
"We could not go back, we could not stand still, we
had no choice but to advance." In those words
1 applied to our position in India a century ago may
be found the key to the present situation. We have
made our preparations, and those preparations '
have been made for just cause, and to resent a
grave insult, and we cannot go back from them ; s
I and that we cannot stand still is equally evident,
i We have no choice but to advance. S here A li is
the wolf that we have by the ears, and it certainly
is impossible to loose the hold we are steadily
' tightening upon hini until he has submitted to us.
But he is, after all, a very insignificant wolf if he
is only dealt with in the proper manner. If we
refuse to follow the advice of some of our well-
intentioned and patriotic friends, and break our
heads against the Khyber by precipitation, and
only work out completely and thoroughly the firm .
' policy followed by Lord L ytton , it will be no
Si difficult matter to tame even the fierce wolf of
Cabul, as we have already tamed many a fierce wolf
in India and elsewhere. S heee All's defensive
measures can be paralysed by an advance against Can-
dahar, and by the occupation of the KhurumYalley ;
but so long as he retains possession of his southern
capital he will persist in believing either in his
! capacity for resisting us or of tiring us out. In this
matter of our crisis with Cabul we cannot play a
waiting game, and " Anglo-Indian " is evidently
I persuaded that such is the intention either here at
home or out in India. He strongly denounces the
backwardness that has been shown in not cordially
supporting the activity of Lord L ytton , and, as he
pertinently reminds us, no Cabinet Council has yet
been summoned to consider what we are to do 1
i when the English troops are all concentrated on
the Afghan frontier, and cannot advance further
without violating Afghan territory. The rumours
that the advance is to be postponed until the spring
certainly do to some extent justify the strictures of
our correspondent upon the timidity that would
shirk dealing with our difficulty with S here A li in ,
a thorough manner.
* To concentrate three columns on the frontier of
a foreign Power whose hostility had been declared
and then to sit down and await his return to sanity
and friendship would be a policy that Asiatics
could by no possibility comprehend. Both Cabul and
India would construe it into a confession of
weakness, that in its effects could only be disastrous
to us as a governing Power, and that must in
fallibly elevate Russian prestige in Central Asia,
soon to be debased if we follow the true policy,
to a higher pitch than it has attained even by
the annexation of the better half of Armenia. As
Mr. L owe says, <£ we have no course but to
advance, unless, of course, S here A li concedes
what we have demanded, and makes the amplest
reparation for the outrage offered to our representa
tive at Ali Musjid. But until the A meer demon
strates that he has unequivocally abandoned the
Russian alliance so recently accepted by him, and j
has resolved to act towards us more fairly and |
more friendly than he ever has before, we have no j
option save to continue the forward movement we i
j are now carrying out, and to strike a forcible blow j
at some of the exposed quarters of his State.
Candahar, above all others, lies open to attack, and
the advance of British troops to Dera Ghazi Khan
proves that the Indian Government has resolved
if necessary to strike at that city. The fact that we
intend to utilise the Sangarh Pass, which is incom
parably the best and easiest along the whole
frontier, proves that the' Indian Government
is not in favour of half measures, and that
nothing but complete submission on the part of
S here A li yyill be held by it to satisfy the
exigencies of the occasion. We cannot doubt that
the instant the home authorities think it necessary
to declare their policy towards S here A li they
will do so in no hesitating phrases, but
in an unequivocal endorsement of the policy
of Lord L ytton . It is possible to magnify
our crisis with Cabul, but it is far easier
to minimise it. We can upset S here A li
at any moment, if necessary, and in that con
viction many rest content with the philosophical
belief that the Afghan crisis is still a bugbear.
But although we can overthrow him it would be
weak to despise him, and the part he might play in
the Punjab, either with allies or without, so deeply
that we ignored his existence altogether. The Indian
Government shows no trepidation in dealing with the
crisis^ but it manifests a keen appreciation of the
question in all its bearings. The country has
ratified the policy of Lord L ytton in a most pro
claimed manner, and for our part we cordially agree
with the scheme he has sanctioned. There may or
there may not be a diHerent attitude elsewhere,
but Lord L ytton has at all events evinced
remarkable promptitude, and promptitude is the
wat chw ord of the hour.
LONDON, M ONDAY, SEP TEMBER 30.
Sir Neville Chamberlain arrived at Simla on
Saturday,
Our special correspondent at Simla telegraphs!
that the vernacular press of Northern India is
nearly unanimous in praise of the Viceroy's Cabul
policy, and specially approves the employment
of native nobles in the Cabul Mission, as being'
calculated to show to foreigners the union that
existe rulera and the ruled, and to
■j exhibit to the people the confidence of the Go-
Ill vernment in native loyalty.
Inofficial quarters at St. Petersburg it is held i
that there is no warrant for ascribing to Rus-|
sian counsels the stoppage of the English Mission ;
to C a,bul. |
L&srr L yixon ' s Government, with becoming
decision, lost no ITftie in directing the assembly
! of forces on the Afghan frontier. Whatever may
bo the-ultimate course of events, this prompti-
- tude was absolutely imperative, since it showed
the world that a proper estimate had been
formed at Simla with regard to the Khyber
incident. Moreover, the instant issue of orders
was a matter of considerable moment from a
purely practical as well as political point of
view. India is a country of "magnificent
distancesthe comparatively large army we
maintain there is not massed in powerful
bodies, but scattered in cantonments; and
time is always required to bring together a
field force of some numerical strength. No doubt
1 the railways already finished will materially
augment the speed of movements; but it must
not to be forgotten that squadrons, battalions,
and batteries will have to march over long tracts
before swifter carriage is available. The inter
val needed to collect a column will be diminished
by the fact that Northern India is always occu
pied in strength, and that the railways may be |
employed to forward reliefs and reserves from
the south and east. When the most has been
made of every advantage afforded by road, rail,
and river, there must be what will look like
delay. In addition to the ordinary obstacles
which have to be overcome in collecting an
army, there is the further and pressing need for
| supply and transport. The Indian commissariat
| is usually well prepared, and we cannot believe
that the events which have occurred during the
past three years have not induced the Government
to increase its resources at several stations, as
well as to keep full account of means obtainable
at short notice. Nevertheless, some weeks
must elapse before the several columns are
equipped sufficiently to enter on active service.
As no immediate hostilities are in contemplation,
^there is time enough to organise the powerful
little armies now gathering in the Punjab and