Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎57v] (118/312)

beyond the Indus ; and it may be fairly assumed
that the military and civil authorities will exert
t themselves to the utmost in order that not an
f hour should intervene between decision and action.
Preceding experience, gained by trying operations
during the last twenty years, should enable the
Government to avoid the grave error of encum
bering the forces employed by permitting the
addition of a single pound of baggage or one ser
vant more than may be strictly necessary. Upon
this head both the C hamberlains and scores of
frontier officers will be able to speak with
authority; while the Commander-in-Chief of
India is too good a soldier to allow a fungus
growth of impedimenta to hamper military
movements. On the other hand, considering
the nature of the country beyond the Indus, a
meagre equipment would be a serious mistake ;
but so many expeditions into the hills have been
carried out since 1850 that ample materials on
which a correct estimate may be based must
exist in the Government offices. For the pre
sent, therefore, we must await patiently the
complete formation of the several columns, so
that when they move the rough task before
them may be swiftly and eifectivoly ac
complished.
Perhaps it is premature to flpecnlatemjon-the
mode of solv ing a complex
; problem wliich may bo adopted. One thing,
however, should be borne in mind—that head
strong advice to enter Afghanistan by four or
five passes is the offspring of new-born zeal and
unsound judgment. Far more is known about the |
frontier and the roads into the Ameer's territory j
| now than was accessible thirty on forty years i
ago. There are not one or two, but half a dozen I
practicable paths through the mountains, and the
- most notorious are, among the least useful. As
a matter of fact, there is no need to ascend the
Bolan or thread the mazes of the Khyber and
Khoord^Cabul in order to master the country ;
but whatever line be taken it will be well to direct
the main effort by 6ne route rather than to split
up a valuable force into half-a-dozen fragments.
Judging from the dispositions already ordered,
it would appear that the Government favours a
concentrated as opposed to a diffusive military
policy. What has been ordered ? The assembly
of a column at Thul, the reinforcement of the
| Quetta garrison, and the gathering of a reserve
| at Sukkur. These arrangements point to a di-
j version by the Kurrum Valley, and a movement
in strength upon Candahar. For it should be
noted that the weaker body is drawn from the
Kohat country, while the selection of Sukkur as
a post for the reserve indicates the Candahar
road as its ultimate destiny. Despite reports
to the contrary, we cannot think that there is
any design to master the Khyber. An oppor
tunity for a march on that side may arise ;
bijt when the path to Candahar is plain and
open, and when the pressure on the Ameer
which the occupation of his Southern provinces
would exert is manifest, we cannot believe that
lives will be uselessly sacrificed in the sanguinary
task of forcing the Northern passes. Nor is it
necessary, though it may be convenient, to use
the Bolan, because there is a good carriage track
from Gundava to Khelat and thence to Quetta ;
but the same kind of objection does not apply
to the Bolan as to the Khyber, for, being in our
hands, it may be traversed without opposition
from end to end. The vast stores of accu
rate information at the disposal of Sir P aul
H aines will enable him to determine how
effect can best be given to the policy enforced
on the Government, and the orders he has
sent forth show that he is not bound down
to any routine traditions, or likely to adopt
the unsoldierlike plan of applying his troops
in driblets. The political situation created by
the Ameer is so serious that no postpone
ment of action will be justified for any pe
riod beyond the time actually needful to or
ganise well-appointed columns. Should ample
satisfaction not be then received, Candahar
should be seized without an instant's delay, the
Kohat force should enter the Kurrum Valley,
and the reserve, or part of it, move nearer to
the front. Whether it will be necessary to go
further events alone can determine; but, now
the question of mastery has been raised, the
commonest prudence dictates unflagging exertion
until indubitable securities have been solidly
obtained.
In deciding upon its course of action, how
ever, the Indian Government is not wholly at
liberty, as some suggest, to consult the seasons
and military conveniences. One consideration
which must be steadfastly borne in mind is
g native feeling, which has been, beyond doubt.
much" excited by the affront offered to the
English Power, and would not understand a
leisurely and expectant policy. The insult put
upon a British Envoy by the Ameer of Afghan
istan was not " done in a corner." Circumstances
combined to give it instant and universal pub
licity ; and it would be imprudent, if not dan
gerous, to leave the first part of such a passage
in Indian history too long uncompleted by the
second. The public opinion of our Eastern
Empire is not, as in this land, a mandate which
controls, but it is a force which must be studied
1 and respected, and it judges its ruling men
i though it does not appoint them. It would con
demn the Sircar for lack of ancient spirit, and
for want of preparedness, if it saw nothing done
or begun because it is cold at Cabul in De
cember, or because the intentions of Eussia
have still to be learned. At present it is satis
factory An East India Company trading post. to know that the tone of the Indian
press almost without exception is loyal to a re
markable degree. A leading native journal, the
Hindoo Patriot, attributes the affront ventured
upon by S here A li not to any fault of Lord
L ytton's measures, but to the mischievous lan
guage of the un-English party in this country,
which has misled Eussia, and deceived her in
struments. Our Simla despatch communicates the
I fact that the vernacular papers of Northern India
j are nearly unanimous in support of the Vice
roy's policy towards Afghanistan, several among
them, like the Kohinoor of Lahore, particularly
applauding the employment of native noblemen
in connection with the Cabul Mission. They
point to this as a symbol of the union which
exists between the British Eaj and the people
of India, and recall with pleasure an ancient
instance of similar confidence, when Shah J ehan
sent the Maharajah of Jodhpoor as one of his
representatives to the Cabul Court. The faith
jn British strength and fortune which these
expressions of opinion reveal is worth maintain
ing, and will be best maintained by an energetic
answer to the outrage which has been hazarded.
Beyond popular feeling, too, the sentiments
of the chief feudatory Princes must be taken into
account. They also, however well affected, could
hardly remain sincerely loyal if the least doubt
arose as to our power to punish—not by-and-by,
but immediately and signally—a rdenace offered
to the peace and order of Hindostan. Their
guarantee is the ever ready might of the British
rule, and any advantage obtained by slow pro
cedure would be dearly bought if it caused
them to believe that we consulted the almanac
and balanced Eastern and Western complica
tions when the bazaars of the land were ringing
with the story of our Envoy's repulse. Hence
it is necessary that the winter should not arrive
without practical proofs having been afforded
of our power and purpose to efface such an out
rage ; nor is there the least reason to believe that
the Viceroy and her Majesty's Ministers are of
any other opinion. Military preparations have
followed the news from the "Khyber with an
alacrity which will confirm the public con- 1
fidence of India in the British spirit; and, fail
ing the extremely improbable submission of the,
Afghan Prince, such decisive measures will be
promptly, adopted as will vindicate the honour j
and preserve the safety of the Empire.
i ENGLA ND AND CABUL.
TONE OF THE VEHNACULAE
PRESS.
[BY EASTERN COMPANY'S CABLE.]
[from- our special correspondent.]
SIMLA, sept. 29 (5.30 p.m.)
The , vernacular press of Northern India is
nearly' unanimous in praise of the Viceroy's
Cabul policy. The Lahore Kohinoor and several
ether journals specially approve the employment
of native nobles in the Cabul Mission which,
they say, will show to foreigners the union that
exists between the rulers and the ruled, and will
also exhibit to the people the confidence of the
Government in native loyalty. The Kohinoor
recalls the fact that an ancestor of the Jodpore
Maharajah was employed by ShahJehanona
1 mission to Cabul. The chief exception is the
Mooradabad newspaper, which says that the
quarrel must be settled with Eussia.
The Hindoo Patriot, one of the leading na
tive journals, attributes the Cabul quarrel en
tirely to the action of an un-English party in Eng
land, which, deluded t»y the smooth words and
glib promises of Eussia, neglected to take the