'Negotiations with Ibn Saud regarding Boundaries of Saudi Arabia' [‎17r] (33/40)

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4. The following are my reactions to Hankey’s letter,
I should like you and Stobart (if you see no objection
referring to him) to correct or confirm them.
(under
lining
mine)
(1) In another part of his letter Hankey stated that
"our thinking on all this is tentative " If/this remark
does not refer to Foreign Office telegram No.335 of the 5th
August (a copy of which I sent you under complimentary slip
No.334/20/50 of the 9th August) then that telegram is clearly
inconsistent with the statement of the Foreign Office of the
position in the first paragraph of Hankey's letter, i.e. a most
definite line of non-intervention is taken in the telegram^
while the letter states that the Foreign Office cannot decide
what line to take.
(2) As regards encouraging Abu Dhabi aspirations or
encouraging Abu Dhabi to "expand" or encouraging the "annexa
tion" of Buraimi, (whichever phrase is used) I (and I think
Stobart) were inclined to the opinion that the only way of
helping in this was to let the Shaikh have the rifles he
asked for; but that he should not have those rifles because
of his difficult attitude generally and particularly because
of his refusal to accept the Dubai-Abu Dhabi boundary award.
The question which to my mind arises first of all in this
context now is this: if we consider that the Shaikh of Abu
Dhabi's aspirations in Buraimi should be encouraged in view
of the likelihood that their fulfilment would off-set Saudi
expansionism, is the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi's difficult behaviour
no longer (since the Saudi threat probably grows with time)
a good reason for withholding encouragement of those aspira
tions ? (The question of what form such encouragement should
take if the Foreign Office ever agree to it being given -
whether by permitting the Shaikh to get his quota of rifles
or otherwise - is one on which I should welcome your views.)
(3) Personally, I think that we should be sympathetic
to Abu Dhabi aspirations in Buraimi and might go so far now
as to allow the Shaikh the rifles, though it would be better
if he came to see me and made his peace before we do so. I
do not, however, think that we can intervene in such ventures
to any greater extent than that. If, however, the Foreign
Office will not accept "expansionism" or even (if made to them)
the suggestion of sympathy, and permission for the rifles,
which seems to be the idea in the penultimate sentence of
para 4 of Hankey's letter, then we come to the question arising
from that sentence - and the last sentence. Is it necessary
to consolidate "the Abu Dhabi influence and interest in Buraimi
which already rightfully exists "? I understand that Shaikh
Zaid controls six of the eight Buraimi settlements and controls
them absolutely. Is this the case ? If it is, then I can
see no point in Hankey's request for my views.
(4) Is there a real danger of Saudi penetration into
Buraimi ? Stobart in his letter which I have quoted, gives
no opinion about this as he probably thought it was a matter
on which Jeddah should report. I am inclined to think that
e.g. the Na'im and A1 bu Shamis chiefs (like most others of
their sort in the Arabian peninsula) receive presents from
Ibn Saud, and we know about the Saudi slave traders in
Buraimi. I should like information^ if any is available,
regarding presents or any other indications of Saudi penetra
tion. My own idea is that the Saudis are content with the
position as it is and await with confidence the outcome of
the findings re this area of the "fact finding commission"
/in