'File 8/15 Arab Series - 1933-1939' [‎131r] (261/434)

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Letter from H. M.’s Minister, Jedda, to the Foreign Office, No. 146,
dated 17th May 1936.
In my telegram No. 63 of the 13th May (S. No. 36-A), I had the honour
to submit a summary of the account given me by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin of
the visit of my Italian colleague to Ibn Saud’s camp at Ashaira on the 10th
May and of what passed between M. Persico and the King. I do not think
it necessary to send you a full record of my conversation with Sheikh Yusuf,
but I may supplement my telegram by mentioning three points of some
importance which I omitted from it, as follows:—
(a) My Italian colleague, according to Sheikh Yusuf, began his
statement to the King by thanking him for having observed
neutrality in the Italo-Abyssinian war and for not having
taken part in sanctions. The King replied that he had
adopted his attitude for the sake of friendship with all con-
! cerned.
(b) M. Persico stressed the friendly dispositions of his Government
towards the Arab nations and their readiness to give any
required assurances in this respect.
{c) At the end of the private conversation, in which the sheikh en
gaged me after he had carried out his instructions to inform
me of what had passed at Ashaira, he threw out a question
regarding reports that His Majesty’s Government might with
draw from the League of Nations and regarding the conse
quences of such a step, if it were taken.
2 . I did not comment on (a) or (b) above. As regards (c), I took the
general line that I knew of no pronouncement by any responsible person
which could lend support to the reports in question; that many people, it
was true, thought that the League should be reorganised to make it more
useful; but that, whatever happened (and no one could foresee what would
happen), it would astonish me greatly, if Great Britain abandoned or des
paired of the League. 1 adduced various considerations in support of my
opinion, making it clear, of course, that I was only expressing my private
views as between two friends, in accordance with Sheikh Yusuf’s request.
3. Mr. Philby, who was at Ashaira during M. Persico’s visit, spent the
evening at my house on the 13th May. His account of the audience, based
on what he had heard from his friends, and possibly from the King himself,
was generally similar to that given me by Sheikh Yusuf, though not so
complete and more loosely put together. He was even more outspoken than
the sheikh about the perturbation caused in the King’s mind by the outcome
of the Italo-Abyssinian war. The reason for the King’s reaction was, he
said, his concern for British prestige. I could not get him to say definitely
why the maintenance of that prestige should interest the King so greatly,
but the implications of his language were clearly these: Reliance on Great
Britain was the corner-stone of Ibn Sand’s policy. Great Britain had
failed to oppose a successful resistance to Italy in the case of Abyssinia
and had, in fact, let that country down. How, then, could the King have
confidence in the will or ability of His Majesty’s Government to resist
Italian ambitions in the Red Sea? Like Sheikh Yusuf, Mr. Philby spoke
particularly of the Yemen, saying that, when referring to the intended
negotiations between Italy and the Yemen, my Italian colleague had spoken
of a “strengthening” of the relations between the two countries.
4. Mr. Philby is as you are aware, not in the innermost secrets of Ibn
Saud, and his language is very apt to be coloured by his personal sentiments.
Nevertheless, I think tkat what he told me on the 13th May faithfully
represents Ibn Saud’s present outlook. The King watches, as best he can,
events in Europe, but he has little true comprehension of them, much less
of such concepts as that of collective security or any sort of security upheld
189(8) F&PD