File 1377/1905 Pt 1 'Perso-Baluch Frontier: Frontier Demarcation' [‎185r] (141/188)

BrT if , ^ 5 ) 7
. TiliB Document is the Property of His B;itaumc Majesty's Govemmoiu. i
[Eebruary 4 .]
Section 1 .
No. 1 .
Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—[Received February 4.)
(No. 11. Confidential.)
My Lord Tehran, January 6, 1905.
I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship’s information a copy of
a despatch just addressed by me to the Oovernment of India on the subject of the
Mirjawa boundary question.
I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.
Inclosure 1 in No. 1.
Sir A. Hardinge to Government of India.
g* r Tehran, January 6, 1905.
1 HAVE the honour to submit herewith a copy of a telegram which I addressed on
the 1st instant to Colonel MacMahon embodying my views on his latest communications
respecting the Mirjawa boundary, and more especially his demi-official lettei to you of the
1st November last, as to which my opinion is I understand desired by the Government of
India.
I had hoped before the departure of my messenger to-morrow to be m receipt ot a
reply from Colonel MacMahon, whom I bad asked for his observations on this telegram,
and it is possible that 1 may still receive one. I hardly think, howeyei, that any hesh
information which he may give me will substantially modify the view which I have
expressed in the inclosed message.
So far as I understand the situation, an exact delimitation ot the frontier line laid
down in the Holdich Agreement will not only not strengthen our claim to Miijawa and
Duzdab, both of which Captain Webb-Ware believed he could include within our territory,
but will give us a line—the blue line of Colonel MacMahon’s map which would be less
satisfactory than the supposed present one, inasmuch as it will, amongst other things,
bring the Persian frontier to the very doors ot our fort at Robat Killa, and pei haps to a
point east of our present post at Padaha. Colonel MacMahon proposes, in lieu 01 it, a
line marked in red on his map, which he does not believe he could induce his lersian
colleague, the Yamin-i-Nizam, to recommend to the Persian Government, but w hich he
thinks I might perhaps persuade the Ain-ed-Dowleh to accept. .
There are tw r o ways by which I might, I presume, try to carry my point. might
contend that the red line w 7 as the one really in harmony with the intentions ot tne
Holdich Agreement, and trust to the ignorance and indifference ol the 1 eisian .dmisteis.
Or I might approach the latter in a more straightforward fashion; point out that the text
of the Agreement did not correspond with the known intention ot the Commissionei s, and
ask them to agree to the red line, on the ground that the rectification involvet in it
though of no consequence to Persia, would afford a more satisfactory fiontiei, ^ou
promote good relations between the two neighbouring Governments, and might even be
purchased on our side by some small pecuniary payment, or by a corie»pon mg iccti cation
in Persia’s favour further south. ,. ..
The adoption of the first course wmuid, I believe, almost certainly eno in ailuie.
The Ain-ed-Dowleh would reply that he wouid refer the whole question tor ins opinion
to his local expert, the Yamin-i-Nizam. He would probably, or if he did not, ic USi u "
ed-Dowleh would, ask the opinion of the Russians ; and both the Y amm am t ie vussians
would doubtless expose and exaggerate the weakness of our case, and ma/e tie oios • o
what thev would represent as a perfidious attempt on our part to filch va uao.v, an 1 ^ )m
Persia by misrepresentation. The net result would be to make the Peisians regai e
acquisition of the blue line, or of something equivalent to n, as. a ma ei o vita
importance to their interests, and to increase their already existing suspicions 0 our
designs on Persian Baluchistan.
[1822 d—T]