'Memorandum on Persian Railways' [‎104v] (20/84)

headed from the advanee of Russia to the Persian
Gulf. In a minute by the Viceroy (Lord Curzon),
dated the 4th September 1899, enclosed in Foreign
Department letter (Secret), of the Government of
India, No. 175, 21st September 1899,* the question
of Seistan was fully dealt with, and its importance,
economically and strategically, summed up in the
following words : —
“ 12. It will be seen from what I have written
“ that Seistan is, by virtue of its position and its
“ features, an object of much interest both to Russia
“ and Great Britain Situated at the point of
“ junction of the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan,
“ and Baluchistan, its future affects the destinies of
“ all three countries. Lying, as it does, almost
“ midway between Meshed and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
“ no advance can be made from Khorassan to the
“ sea except through Seistan. Its position upon
“ the exposed flank of Afghanistan would render
“ its occupation of great value to any Power con-
“ tern plating either a move against that country or
“ an advance upon Kandahar. Nor will it be
“ denied that the Kandahar-1 lerat line could not be
“ held with safety by India, nor the Valley of the
“ Helmand defended, were a hostile Power in
“ possession of Seistan. Furthermore, the grain-
“ producing capabilities of the district, to the
“ bygone richness of which eloquent testimony is
“ borne by the immense number of ruined cities
“ encumbering the soil, and which could, without
“ serious difficulty, be revived by a scientific
“ employment of the waters of the Helmand, render
“ Seistan of much value, as a possible granary,
“ either to a Power engaged upon a forward
“ advance or to a Power interested in commercial
“ and industrial expansion.”
In the same minute the, project was discussed
of railway connection between Quetta and Seistan,
and the controversy reviewed that had taken place
between Sir II 1). Wolff and Sir 11. Brackenbury on
that subject. The conclusion arrived at was that a
Quetta-Seistan Railway was rightly condemned if
it was only intended as an offensive and strategical
scheme ; its real object, however, was something
different, viz., to save Southern Persia from falling
into the grasp of Russia. It was, properly speaking,
a protective, not an offensive, measure, but Lord
Curzon considered that lor the time being, especially
if we could come to an agreement with Russia, it
woidd be better to postpone consideration of the
scheme, though, except with regard to water, it
offered no engineering difliculties.
Paragraphs 22 to end of the minute are printed
as Appendix I.
Pol. 927/99.
* Enclosed in letter to Foreign Office,
20th December 1899.
18. It would be beyond the scope of this memo
randum to enter fully into the discussion that took
place about this time as to British policy in Persia
{see correspondence marginally quoted), but refer
ence may be made to a second minute of the Viceroy,
dated the 28th October 1901, enclosed in the letter
Discussion of British policy in
Persia.
Government of India Letter, Foreign
Department, Secret, No. 175, 21st Septem
ber 1899.
Pol. 927/99.