'File 3/8 Affairs of Sh. Khaz`als sons.' [‎135r] (269/508)

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SECRET
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undermining the power of subject Shaikhs ensured him many enemies, lie
maintained too the ancient Persian ^raoticc of blinding inport^rit
persons whom he considered treacherous to him. His relations with the
BAKHT1AEI Khans, his northern neighbours, though regulated by^a treaty
of friendship, were soured by ancient hatreds. Nevertheless his great
wealth and the shadow of British support were sufficient to ensure him
immense power.
•jO, At this point it is necessary to note that in the early days
of the War the Government of India envisaged that BASRa would bo
retained as a part of the British Empire. There could be no reason for
returning it to the Turks and an independent Iraq was srill undreamed^or.
Our relations with Persia were governed by the Anglo-Russian ^gr-eemen^
of 1^07 and in this framework our engagements to ohe Sheika ox
were as reasonable as those which still govern our relations vata cne
Shaikh of Kuwait. However the establishment of cho mandate m Iraq, a^a
the sacrifice of Lori CUPEON’s idiglo-Persian treaty to American and French
pressure at the time of the Peace conference left oar agreement wiich^
Shaikh KMiiZ’/iL completely in the air. But the oJd relaoions.ap subsisted,
and the Military Handbook of 1924 states bluntly ^hot the Enai^n has
always been consistently friendly towards the British and now^in his ola
age depends on British advice to a far greater extern: -chan before. That
veiy year was to see our uncoordinated policies ere te for us a situation
of the most painful, embarrassment*
11. The tot to sang constitutional government of SULTii, idfuD Shah
was in 1921 in the hands of Seyyid ZIA ud DIN TABATAB/il (the same v/ho
was recently taken nto rt pimtect:: vo custody" on the orders of QA.VM es
SULTi'iNEH) and this politician opened up negotiations with the Cossack
Brigade of the Persian Army, at that time recuperating behind British
lines from defeat at the hands of the Bolsheviks. As a result of these
negotiations the Brigade under its General REZA Khan marched on TEHRAN,
and a new government was installed with REZA as Minister ox War. Seyyi
ZIA soon withdrew, and in 1923 the Shah followed him apprehensively to
Europe on what was to prove his final exile. In Octooer of the same year
REZA took over the office of prime Minister and addressed himself with
renewed energy to the reduction of insubordinate provincial powers. The
Persian army at that time, thought not outstanding, was a voluntary force
with a leavening of foroign trained troops from the Cossack Brigade and
the South Persia Rifles, and he achieved considerable success. The
Shaikhdom of MOH/dMERAH with its profits for guarding the oil installat
ions and its pretensions to British support was particularly tempting to
the nationalist leader and its turn was not long in coming. The incidents
which follow aro in a sense the crux of this summary and are therefore
given in some detail.
12. In the summer of 1922 a detachment of Persian troops moving
from ISPAHAN to AHvTAZ was attacked, defeated ana driven wi on heavy Toss
of equipment back on to its base by a party of KITIGALU tribesmen. The
Soviet Embassy (then for a variety of reasons unfriendly to Great
Britain and basking in the sun of self righteousness after the nusso- ^
Persian treaty of 1921) gave the lead in a campaign of propaganda to she
effect that this incident had been engineered by the British to prevent
the Persian Government from xnroute-ing with existing arrangements bet
ween ourselves and the- Shaikh of MORAL ER Ji and the jjiiKHTT r.T Khans.
The Russians contin - to direct propaganda against Brioi uterference
in Persian affairs and did all in their power to prevent Khan trom
discussing the sit 11 " -ion in ARABIST AN with us ac all, while encouraging
the TEHRAN press in every possible attack on us. It was against this
background that the svenue cAxmu tc se were oixi-olded-.
13, REZA IGian moved with extreme deliberation. In February 1923
he* transferred ARABISTAN from the ISFAHAN to the HAMAD AN divisional area,
thus enabling movements of troops to be made into the province without