File 345/1908 Pt 2 'Mohammerah: situation. Sheikh's dispute with the Vali of Basra. decoration for Sheikh. renewed assurances to Sheikh.' [‎168r] (340/566)

Wilson s letter is an overstatement of the straits to which he has at times been
reduced, and for which the rottenness of the provincial Turkish administration has been
directly responsible. I quite agree that as the Porte under the new regime reforms her
^administration in the Bussorah vilayet, so must the Sheikh of Mohammerah modernise
his ideas of border relations, and I believe he will do so under our friendly influence and
guidance^ On the other hand hasty and aggressive methods such as those pursued by
Vali Nazif Bey (it in reality his action can be looked upon merely as the vagary of
an impetuous administrative official) are only calculated to defeat their own object.
But can the vali’s proceedings be considered in the above light at all ? The river
generally was perfectly quiet at the time of the Zain incident and had been for a long
period before, and the measures taken by Nazif Bey were not in the least necessary for
the attainment of his professed object, the maintenance of order in the Bussorah
vilayet.
It seems much more probable that, except as a pretext, riverain affairs had nothing
to do with the vali’s proceedings, and that the real motive for them is rather to be
sought in the fact, suggested by His Majesty’s consul, Bussorah, some weeks before the
present difficulty arose, that the Turkish authorities “ would not be sorry for an excuse
to cause trouble to Persia weak and disorganised as she is”; a view to which the
concluding sentence of telegram No. 71 from His Majesty’s Ambassador at Constan
tinople to the Foreign Office affords some corroboration.
The position is not difficult to understand. The Turks have been able to encroach
successfully on Persian territory on the northern portion of the frontier. At the
southern end they have been powerless to do anything of the sort; firstly, because the
Sheikh of Mohammerah can manage the Arabs in his own territory, and, secondly,
because as an Arab he has strong influence also with the Turkish Arabs living near the
frontier, from whom the Turks would consequently get little sympathy or assistance.
Thus, from one side of the border we see that the power of the Sheikh of
Mohammerah and his ability to look after himself constitutes the only bulwark on which
Persia can rely to preserve her from Turkish encroachment on her south-west frontier ;
while from the other side we find that he (with the Sheikh of Koweit indirectly) is the
only obstacle to the furtherance of Turkish designs or national policy in the same region.
The Porte has thus a patent motive for seeking to attenuate the sheikh’s power and
detach his Arab adherents from him, and the simplest means of effecting that object is
for them to make things unpleasant for the Arab tribesmen living near the frontier and
endeavour to show them, now that they (the Turks) have some force at their command
that the sheikh can no longer hold them in their difficulties, as of old.
I he Porte ^ could hardly have selected a better opportunity for giving practical
expression to this policy than the present occasion. Nazim Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. had just arrived at
Bagdad with large powers and a flourish of trumpets. At Bussorah they had recently
replaced an Arab governor by an assertive “ Young Turk.” Their gun-boat “ Marmaris ”
was in working trim.
In the other camp the juncture found Sheikh Khazal in bad odour with a Cabinet
at Tehran dominated by a Bakhtiari chief also anxious both for personal and tribal
reasons to harm the sheikh and reduce his power. It was even suggested, you will
remember, that the Persian Government or Medjliss had been previously approached
and squared before the attack on the sheikh’s village took place.
Lastly, the instrument selected by the vali was an excellent one for the purpose,
owing to bis personal importance as a tribal leader and to his close relations with Sheikh
Khazal. The vali must have known very well that he could not expect such a man to
submit to arrest by a handful of gendarmes ; just as he knew well enough that it was not
possible for the sbeikh to hand over his own tribal elder and brother-in-law to the
Bussorah police. This mere fact no doubt supplied the necessary pretext for the use of
the “ Marmaris.”
The vali’s own behaviour since the incident is quite in harmony with the above
theory. He was cordially welcomed by Nazim Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. at Bagdad, and so far from proving
amenable to any influence or persuasion applied by Mr. Crow in order to induce him to
express regret to the sheikh he almost indignantly rejected his overtures and refused to
entertain at all the question of personal amends on the ground that he had only acted
under instructions and there had been nothing personal in the matter.
But whether the Zain incident was a personal vagary of the vali’s or a premeditated
plan emanating from the Porte, the fact remains, I submit, that it is our interest and
our policy to maintain the Sheikh of Mohammerah in his position as a powerful Arab
ruler at the head of the Gulf. So sure as we do not, our own position will suffer with
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