File 600/1905 Pt 3 'Aden Hinterland: Situation; Withdrawal of Political Agent from Dthala; Treaties with Haushabi, Kotaibi and Alawi chiefs' [‎203r] (401/508)

recline at home a mere puppet; view the dismemberment of his country in
silence and remorse, and he hoped Government would not then make him res
ponsible for the security for the roads. By the Treaty he responsible, hut
how could he fulfil his engagements if his country was to be disintegrated.
Jtners, now sitting on the fence/’ would observe this confession of his inabi
lity to coerce his tribesmen, and, taking their cue accordingly, would set up
separate and petty principalities and then good bye, for ever, to his authority
and the peace of the country. J
With this parthian shot he withdrew.
The 5th January 1907.
H. F. JACOB, Major,
Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Dthala.
My interview with Muhammad Saleh at Suleik on 1st and 2nd and 3rd
instant was to prevent the Kotaibis joining the Amir’s forces at Dthala and
also, more especially, to dissuade him from carrying out the hint, couched in
his letter, that if the Amir succeeded in enlisting some of the Kotaibis, the others
would be sorely tempted to mass and take the Amir’s places at Hardaba, “ at
Tafwa ” and Karafa. This because (1) the Amir had persistently neglected to
settle his differences with the Kotaibis, and (2) the Amir was wantonly trvino-
to create divided counsels in this tribe by enlisting a portion of them against
the Chief’s wishes, thereby overthrowing Muhammad Saleh’s endeavours to
rehabilitate himself as the one recognised head of the Kotaibi clan.
2. I told Muhammad Saleh that with his great expectations from Govern
ment he would be ill-advised to mix himself in any way in the Amiri-Shairi
quarrel which I was striving to break up. He replied he would do his best in
the matter, but the Amir had sown discord and he could not guarantee his
tribesmen holding aloof. Further, he had a tacit agreement with Jabal Jihaf
to discountenance the opposition and ill-feeling of the Amir towards them : that
the Jabal Jihafis were tribesmen and not subjects, and the British Government
had acted with undue haste when they gave over Jabal Jihaf, which was
clearly a Zindnni possession, to the rule of the Amir of Dthala. The Amir
might indeed be styled overlord, but what gain to the original holders was
the°re if the iniquitous Turkish regime had merely been transferred to an
equally tyrannical Amiri administration ? That the Amir might rightly tax
his own subjects, for there the land was his own and the fields were tilled by his
own. (&) As to the Shairis, there was a compact made with them in the time
of Amir Ali Mukbil, the predecessor of Amir Shaif, and their respective
rights and duties were there clearly defined. If the Government left the
country at this juncture, he, Muhammad Saleh, foresaw nothing but bloodshed
and unrest, for the Amir had made many enemies during the British occupa
tion of Dthala.
3. I saw the Alawi Chief also at A1 Kash’a on the 3rd instant. He had
been asked to join the Amir, but flatly declined to come up save as a mediator.
This Sheikh also denounced the Amir’s pretentions on Jabal Jihaf and the
Sharif both of whom were tribesmen as opposed to subjects. He said, further,
that the Amir’s rule by subordinates had incensed the whole country-side and
that Habil Jubari, the Dthala suburb, which was largely populated by Alawi
men, had written to him its resolve to migrate southwards.
This last remark is perhaps incorrect. Sheikh Ali Nasher is biased against
the Amir for various reasons.
4 Mv own idea is that it is all important to stop the Amir’s bellicose inten-
lions at Dthala, for I am convinced that he has po just nor sane claim against
L Shairis If he merely wishes their recognition ot his fathership, he should
leave them alone altogether. The blood feud has been continuous between
hem for some 160 years, and, as tribal custom in the matter of the lex tahoms
■wertides Koranic sanction as interpreted by the commentators, it is well nigh
impossible to proceed on lines that would appeal only to more civilised peoples.
29
C32FD