File 600/1905 Pt 3 'Aden Hinterland: Situation; Withdrawal of Political Agent from Dthala; Treaties with Haushabi, Kotaibi and Alawi chiefs' [‎205r] (405/508)

thereof 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, which comprise my views on this point of the Amir’s
suzerainty over his tribesmen. It is best at this stage to let things take their
course. There were two alcernatives either (1) to bolster up the Amir in terms
of the earliest stated policy, or (2) to recognise the Arab’s noted objection to a
predominant partner and to follow the line of tribal penchant and idiosyncrasy.
The Amir has sown the wind and is reaping the whirlwind. At^ our departure
he will be compelled to come to an early settlement of his differences,
2. As to the Amir’s recent reverse at the hands of the Shairi, a truce is
now being discussed both with the Shairis and Jabal Jihafis who have
combined to withstand the Amir. Negotiations are said to commence after
the Td, which falls on 25th instant. Muharram the following month is
held to be sacred. In it war is vetoed. This may facilitate a temporary truce.
The Amir is trying to arrange some modus vivendi with Jabal Jihaf by which
he hopes to satisfy the Shairis also.
The Amir has no claims on lands in Shairi territory proper, but has private
property on the Hill ; hence his anxiety to propitiate these Jihafis, who are
incensed by his recent and exorbitant revenue collections on their Hill.
At the same time a report is current that failing a truce, which the
Shairis are disinclined to concede to Amiri treachery, the Amir will seek to
regain his prestige, and will once more call in his lately dismissed mercenaries
and also use his own guns.
3. If this latter be the correcter estimate, or even if a truce be proclaimed,
it is better, I think, for us to tarry a little longer on this plateau, for our
presence tends towards peace and this influence should not be withdrawn too
quickly. I would suggest that our departure synchronise with the close of
February.
If the Amir, after all, elects to fight, I see no finality to the bad feeling
abroad, but on the other hand we can effect but little by a more prolonged
stay, so long as I have so small a voice in Arab affairs.
4. The result of fighting will, however, be the rise of various and petty
principalities a’d over the Amir’s dominions. Others, e.g., his tribes, on the
Elver Tiban, of Hamada and Ahmedi, on seeing the Amir s discomfiture
nearer home, and his reduction, which I prophesy, to the bare status of
“ Sheikh of Dthala ” will themselves start to carve out independent pnnci-
palities ” la other words, the Arabs seeing our impending depart are and
abstention from tribal affairs, are working towards the cherished goal or tubal
independence and a minimum of Arab control.
5. There will then arise the question of the Amir’s ability to fuiai his
Treaty conditions qua the security of the route from Dthala to the fron .
If he fails here, his Treaty will call for amendment.
I have often represented to the Amir the gravity of the situation, and
pointed to the abyss to which he is fast moving. He, however, is much in the
hands of subordinates. If again worsted in fight, Amir ^
of vexation, or very possibly be ousted from his position. He has not endeared
himself even to the people of Ethala town.
6 Jabal Jihaf, as already reported, is administered by one Mukbil Nagi
Zindani The Zindani faction was predominent during Turkish ascendency and
before this, and the house of Zindani received a Turkish dole. Even now^ H
the Hill be severed from the Amir, I f a “ ^^^ethois are distasteful to
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withstand^he Amir’s advances, and if the present rancour subsides I predict
the fall of this upstart and a reversion to the independence of t e i •
Turkish intrigue will certainly he rife there if the Amir’s influence is on
the wane, and its working will he the more subtle since the boundary now
delimited has reduced visible violation to a minimum.
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