File 600/1905 Pt 3 'Aden Hinterland: Situation; Withdrawal of Political Agent from Dthala; Treaties with Haushabi, Kotaibi and Alawi chiefs' [‎207v] (410/508)

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3. So far as the Kotaibi Chief is concerned, I would repeat the recom.
mendation that he should he granted the proposed stipend of Es. 50 a month,
and add that it would seem politic to confirm the desired reconciliation with
that tribe either by the grant of a suitable present of rifles and ammunition, or
by the restoration of the arms confiscated in 1903. I would definitely
recommend a present of 50 rifles with 100 rounds of ammunition per rifle as#
the preferable course, in virtue of which the tribe should, as Major Jacob^
suggests, be held responsible for the Hahilen portion of the Aden-Dthala
road.
4. At the same time the Alawi Sheikh's responsibility might similarly be
allocated and defined upon the grant to him of the concessions which I have
already recommended. And I then see no reason why his post should not be
moved, as Major Jacob suggests, from Ear al Quabtan to Mabaja near Jimil.
5. I do not recommend that the Kotaibi should be under any circum
stances allowed to re-impose road dues on passing caravans.
A memorandum on Hinterland affairs "with special reference to the relations existing between
the Amir of Dtbala and his tribesmen.
No. 61.
The late Captain Warneford had a definite policy initiated by the Eesidency
and aiming at the reconciliation of the Kotaibis to ourselves after the fight.
He failed because his terms to Muhammad Saleh offered the latter no corre
sponding advantages. In consideration of their return to an amicable state
of mind which would conduce te peace on the road they were to become
friends of Government, hnt there was nothing tangible to tempt their return.
My immediate predecessor Major Merewether mentioned to Muhammad Saleh
the possibility of a stipend from Government, and I have been able after much
trouble to persuade the Chief and tribesmen to visit me both here and at
Suleik, and have myself also held out the possibility of some quid pro quo as
compensation for the loss of revenue which our prohibition of their road dues
entailed.
2. In August 1905 I drew up a provisional memorandum in which
Muhammad Saleh unconditionally waived all claims to road dues,—taken
confessedly contrary to custom,—and also engaged that he would safeguard
the route lying along his country, if ever his hounds were restored to him.
Eurther, were a stipend given him he undertook first of all to win and main
tain control over his tribesmen and to arrange for them an adequate division
of the expected favours of Government.
3. This clan, more than the others who collectively form what is termed
the Eadfan tribesmen, have always suffered from internal divisions and the
inconveniences of many scattered leaders, and Muhammad Saleh’s Chieftaincy
was disputed—notably by his nephew Mukbil Abdallah who speaks for a large
following. By dint of always refusing this man an audience and making him
approach me through his uncle’s medium I have managed to break up his
faction. Outwardly, at least, he is now at one with Muhammad Saleh, the
Chief. Without this unification of the clan it was dangerous to have considered
the grant of concessions to one particular Sheikh, and was tantamount to putting
a premium on the constant restlessness of the Kotaibis and the for all-time
insecurity of the trade route.
4. Muhammad Saleh’s allegiance secured, and the tribal section in train
of being welded into some vraisemblance of unity, I offered to examine—what
till then I had refused to consider—the various grievances Muhammad Saleh
had to urge against us. Naturally, he dilated on the loss of crops, and the
demolition of houses by our troops. I told him this was the fortune of war;
that the fight had been provoked by his people after trying our patience to the
last limit. This point Muhammad Saleh now clearly sees, though, Arab-like,
he is not going to lose any chance by a failure to represent his case in the largest
dimensions.