File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎270r] (27/226)

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principle, tlien, we hold in common. Tie
suggested applications of that principle, however,
disclose a view of its practical meaning, which I
am unable to share. For example, Your Excel-
ency discusses the use of a subsidy in enabling the
Amir ot D thala to hold his own 4her against, the
tha^” u® rUrkS; a »dg?-in-Tm r rcjciuJ upon
that such success as has hitherto attended the' 4
„ f, ( ’ '7 c, . f “"solidating the waning authority of
„ the ^• mir 1 of U tha la, has been mainly due to ‘the
„ “'' ra ! an ,^ mutual support which is afforded to
“ th» Tt -k i r preSe I 1C ? of our P olit ical agent and
the British force at that place.” Or, as the Aden
,, eS t | e “ t P uts lf ’ the moral support of our troops
*< T-u m overCome the reluctance (of the
tribesmen) to accept the Amir’s suzerainty.”
Purely here is an unexpected version of tlie
policy of non-interference with the domestic
a airs o he tribes, and studious non-entansde-
k ln P urel y tribal affairs (paragraph 8).
-fit seems to reduce cordial adhesion to the
much less hopeful level of pious opinion>
Ibis rather perplexing interpretation of the policv
ot non-mterference and freedom from entanode-
ment undergoes in later paragraphs a still more
formidable extension. “If Turkish intrigue and
<{ Mahometan fanaticism are to he left uncontrol led
lu that country [the Aden Hinterland] ”—so
the Government of India assure me—“ we fear
“ that we slla ^ before long be involved in opera-
“ tl0ns tha t might have been avoided by a firm
“ and consistent attitude towards the tribes ”
(paragraph 13). But what is this attitude to be ?
Interference or non-interference ? We are to take
in band from Aden the control of Turkish intrigue
and Mahometan fanaticism. “ The furtherance of
the Pan-Islamic programme in Yemen,” says the
Resident at Aden, “ would result from our with
drawal.” Can we hope to exercise this control over
such subtle and pervasive forces as fanaticism and
intrigue without meddling in any of the internal
and domestic doings of the tribes ? TVe are ur^ed
to look even further than this. “ There is a real
danger,” Your Excellency warns/Uwjl “ that, if we
“ n o w withdraw, in a few years we may be
“ confronted with an independent Arabia.” These
apprehensions, if I understand them aright, point
to an indefinite period of such observation and
control as would either he meaningless and in
effectual, or else would inevitably draw us into
that active, perpetual, and costly interference, to
the mischiefs of which we all with entire sincerity
profess ourselves alive.
I find myself compelledjire&poQnul^ to
don to the Indian aspect of this
fk . CUw*"*- A 4. Here I
-ft; !f aw attention to the Indian aspect „
discussion that being the only aspect with which
Government of India is immediately concerned.
q are, it would seem, to extend the military and
financial liabilities of_India, not merely to .lieln or
~lm^tftc4^the.
^ out “ to si
xx.yyu j_Lj.v.rely to help or^
eg the fortress at ^ flri'Hir ro J
dem a religious tide in Yemen,” though.
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