File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎277v] (42/226)

to time that our policy in direct negotiations with
the tribesmen has had to follow the varying exi
gencies of the time. For instance, the Suhiuhis
were, by the engagement of the 5th of May IS M
recognised as under the “ sovereign authority ol
the Abdali Sultan, hut after five years it became
necessarv to treat this arrangement as inoperative,
and the Subaihis resumed their old position ol
independent relations with the Aden Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. .
But the important point to notice is that dining
the last half century these inter-tribal disputes, as
well as more serious differences with the Turks,
have, to a large extent, regulated themselves, and
admitted of peaceful settlement by the Resident at
Aden, without the continual presence of troops or
Political Agents in the interior. In the opinion of
His Majesty’s Government the recent demarcation
and protectorate treaties ought to strengthen the
hands of the Political authorities at Aden m
resuming the policy of inactivity formerly pursued,
and do not call for any departure from it. It may
be perfectly true that the Arabs expect the British
troops to remain in their country, and that some
Chiefs and some sections of trihes would he glad of
their support. But His Majesty’s Government
never authorised any action winch would commit
them to such an extension of their responsibilities,
involving, as it must do, an augmentation of the
Aden garrison, and increased expenditure. I he
protection which they have more formally extended
to the tribes is a protection against foreign aggres
sion, and had particular reference to the proceedings
of the Turkish Government, on whose good faith
to respect the boundary agreed upon reliance must
be placed. The presence of a British garrison at
D’thala, which is only too likely to be regarded as
a sort of menace to the sacred cities, cannot but
obscure a policy of trust in the diplomatic assu
rances made by the Porte, and for the reasons
stated in paragraph :2 of my Despatch dated 4th of
May 1906, is open to other serious objections.
3. It is, however, stated in the correspondence
now sent to me that Aden is unhealthy, and that
troops cannot be trained at Aden. No statistics
are furnished in support of the first statement, and
neither the Aden Administration reports nor the
Army Medical reports accessible to me tend to
prove that the climate has become of late more
injurious either to Native or European troops.
Compared even with the returns for Poona, Aden
seems to be not particularly unhealthy. Indeed,
it would appear that the Native troops have suffered
more severely than before since they were required
to serve in the interior. Be that as it may, it
seems but reasonable to expect that when the
garrison is reduced to what is necessary for the
maintenance of the fortress and the protection of
British territory, the health of the troops will not
be worse than it was. As regards the training of
troops, I understand that the position is not
affected by anything which has occurred of late,