File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎284v] (56/226)

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8. Having thus explained that we have no desire to extend our rospon-
gihilities and entangle ourselves in purely tribal affairs, we proceed to the
examination of a question to which we attach vital importance and which it
appears to us may have been prejudged, under ^ejdea that we are associated
with a policy that we in no way desire to support. We refer to the decision
that the troops and the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. should be withdrawn from D thala. If
His Majesty’s Government were led to that decision by a fear that our ageats
at D* thala would use their position there as a vantage-ground for undue inter
ference with the tribes, their views may be materially modihed by the strong
opinion of the Bombay Government, which at first viewed the establishment of
the Political Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. there with distrust, and by the assurances to the contrary
which we have now given. And the facts that there is no accommodation for
the D’thala troops at Aden, and that the arrangements necessary for their
return to India or England must involve some delay, give us an opportunity of
submitting the matter for reconsideration both on strategical and general
grounds.
9. His Majesty’s Government hold that the strength of Aden as a fortress
will obviously be impaired by the location of troops at a distance from its
fortifications, and that, as the recent delimitation has fixed a line beyond which
Turkish troops or agents cannot advance, the rfitcntion of British troops
or the permanent maintenance of a Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at D thala, is both unprofi
table and a source of weakness. We desire respectfully to question these con
clusions. Regarded from a purely strategic point of view, the situation of
the post at D’thala only 96 miles from Aden is, in the opinion of our military
advisers, such as to augment the strength of that fortress Eor dominating as
D’thala does the principal points on the newly-demarcated frontier, and com
manding the main trade routes which lead to Aden from the Hinterland, it
enables us with a small body of troops, and at no great expense, owing to the
comparatively small extent of country concerned (far smaller than that of
Somaliland) to enforce our will at any time and promptly to repress at its start
anv movement which promises to he dangerous. ^ If we were to withdraw from
this advantageous position, we should leave the initiative to the tribes, who by
choosing the time most inconvenient to us could give much trouble and lock
up a considerable body of troops. It must be remembered, moreover, that
D’thala occupies an important position on the line of communications
between Aden and Yemen, and that there is a prospect that the tiedjaz
Railway will at a near date be continued to the Yemen, or that an independent
line linking up with the Hedjaz system will be constructed. It is in fact only
a few months since the British Ambassadors at Constantinople and Baris
informed Sir Edward Grey of schemes seriously put forward for a line from
Hodeida through Sana to Taiz, in the direction of Aden, which would
he linked up with the Hedjaz line. With a Turkish rail-head at Taiz
close to our recently-delimitated border and linked up with Constantinople and
no point occupied in the Hinterland from which British influence could be
effectively exerted to retain the allegiance of the tribes, it would be possible
seriously to threaten Aden from the land side, and the whole strategic position
of that fortress would be changed.
10. The sanctioned garrison of the Aden Fortress consists of the following
troops:—
3 Companies Royal Garrison Artillery;
600 British Infantry;
1 Company Sappers ;
1 Battalion Native Infantry ;
The Aden Troop.
Barrack accommodation does not exist for more than this strength and it
is impossible to keep troops in camp at Aden. The former practice was o
retain the remainder of the British Regiment in India, which was in every way
undesirable. The necessity for producing visible arguments on the spot m the
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