File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎291v] (70/226)

security. There is no need that it should he made beyond the limits of Abdali
territory, and difficulties of construction alone would, I think, preclude its being
taken into the Dthala hills.
6 . Having stated my opinion generally, I now propose to consider in
greater detail the effect of such a policy on—
(i) the Amir of Dthala,
(ii) the Hinterland tribes on the frontier and those through whose
territory main caravan routes pass,
(iii) the Turks and the Imam of Yemen,
(iv) our ability to restrict the illicit arms traffic, and on their re-export
to Somaliland, and elsewhere.
With regard to the Amir 'of Dthala, it is certain that he would view with
little less than consternation the withdrawal of our troops from Dthala. As a
result of thirty years of Turkish encroachment and intrigue, his tribesmen have
learned an independence and a waywardness that have estranged them from
him. The moral support which the Amir derives from the actual presence of
our troops in his country has done much to correct this, and will in time over
come the reluctance to accept his suzerainty which constitutes his prime weak
ness at present. Save for our presence in his country he would be unable to
fulfil his treaty obligations qud keeping open the roads and protecting the
traffic they carry. He is well aware that our presence in his country does not
predicate any desire on our part to administer his territory, but the time when
he will be able and willing to dispense with our support is yet too far distant to
determine. Withdrawal at this juncture wnuld be disastrous to the Amir.
(ii) The same applies in a different degree to the frontier tribes and to
those through whose territory run the main trade routes. As an example I
may cite the case of the Haushabi Sultan. This Chief is a young and inexpe
rienced ruler of tw r o years’ standing who has no better example to follow than
that of his uncle of infamous memory, who habitually coquetted with the
Turks and alienated the sympathies of his tribesmen by his tyrannical rule.
The realisation of Sultan Ali Mani’s hopes depend upon our presence in the
country. He has an extensive territory coterminous with the Turkish border
and some of the principal trade routes pass through his country. He has
frequently complained of revenue aggressions by Turkish Arabs. These
aggressions, though not serious in themselves while we are at hand to support
him, would soon become so if we withdrew from the country. It should be
recollected that even though the Turkish Government may desire, they have
not the ability, to restrain their Arab subjects and intrigue and aggression will
become chronic.
Again the case of the Upper Yafai may be instanced. ^ There is here no
actual demarcation of the border, nor may such be desirable just now. But the
Yafai require the constant and close attention of the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. . ^ On our
withdrawal, Turkish political ascendency would follow on Turkish intrigue.
The same may be said of the confederacy which comprises Juban, Nawa, and
Dabiani which are all closely united in Arab politics with Upper Yafai. Juban,
it has been allowed, is within the sphere of Turkish influence, while the restate
within our own. Juban resents this decision and accuses us of bad faith and
threatens to bring about the defection of the other three. If we withdraw, we
shall everywhere be accused of surrendering Arab interests to the Turks aad
our prestige will suffer proportionately.
(iii) As to the effect of our withdrawal on the Turks and the Inam of
Y emen it is not difficult to predict that the Turks would view our departure
with unqualified satisfaction. It would afford them unlimited opportunities for
intrigue and for the furtherance of their pan-Islamic programme. The Imam
himself is no negligible quantity. The success that has attended his arms
constitutes a serious menace to Turkish preeminence in the province of the
Hedjaz and the two sacred cities. The Arab world on this side of the border is
w r atcking with keen interest the conflict in the Yemen. The Imam may yt
rule the territories contiguous to our frontier. It is well known that he has
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