File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎350v] (188/226)

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. adhere to our principle of a minimum of interven-
encouragement We * mus J b e schooled to work at their own
tion in Arab affairs T necessar ii y come from without. This is why
salvation, but stimulus abruptly ended, nor even curtailment be
our stay in th “ c0 "“ tr y of our task and are unable
prophesied. We are mer ^ J nrolono-ed stay. The conservation of the
profitably to discuss 0 ° g ca ^ P f or fi? 9 t-hand study. It is true that by
Arab anddemocrat . ig boun d to protect
stipulation the Amir for he is the weai^ to do 90 . We must
his own roads: m° rall 3^ P ^ he ^ A ^ iri history of constant Turkish
recognise his short °°“ t . t h e Amir’s secret devotion to our benign
terronsation and encroach .th ^ ^ ^ w i s h e s of those ou the
methods while outw „ y , • v have preven ted Amir Shaif from appearing in
spot. These a re fa “ f ,! t ri besrae n as tlie Sha’iris, placed twixt Dthala and
better colours. tll e Turkish invasion compelled to throw
^ others,^. ^ the Kotaibis took advantage of pre-
o ... nminlpd with theif distance from Dthala to become practically
Mepe^dentl and at tills time both these large sections remain, always secretly
and often openly hostile to his claims of suzerainty.
The course indicated to the Political Officer in Dthala is to give the Amir
i f TVn<a has been my steady aim. Everywhere in his districts
“ins stTnhk company and in countless ways I strive to effect a reconciliation
with his tribesmen" The results are with time. No reform can be pressed
“ »u unwOUno- pupil. Suggestions are offered, and if finally approved are
ron foot ae^allyb/the Amfr. The people learn their ruler’s importance
while the reform endures, being neither enforced nor premature.
Now along these times of bridging over the existing estrangement between
ruler and ruled is the scheme “ I propound oy
which the people co-operate to safeconduct trade
along the trade routes. It is unadvisable, seeing the
Amir’s actual predicament, to say to him, “ You are
bv treaty hound to police the route lying in your
country. Make, therefore, suitable arrangements, failing which you will suffer
the penalty attaching to a breach of engagement, plus the resultant tribal
ill-will” Hoc volo sic jubeo. Nothing will be gamed, but we shall see
tribal resentment increased an hundred-fold. The Amir unaided,
police his roads. He has tried and failed. If it be said that his vastly
increased emoluments from Government call for more successful efforts, i
would reply that though in theory this is correct, yet surely the battered
position to which we have raised, and now left, the Amir has demanded the
corresponding enhanced stipend he now receives. He is our creation, and ha 1-
measures would defeat our end in view. To adhere to the strict letter ot the
bond will mean disaster to the cause we espouse. We shall be obliged here
after to give armed assistance, and the harvest will be an increase of dissensions,
restlessness, insecurity of route, and, as a resultaut. diminution of trade our
arrival, that it, at the very opposite pole to which we are now steering.
To cement their friendship it is that I have advocated a stipend, through
the Amir’s medium, for Muhammad Saleh, the Kotaibi Chief, and in additii n
would secure the co-operation of Kotaibis and others in the patrolling and
.safeguarding of the trade-route from Dthala to Nobat Dakim.
This oan be best done by an embryonic form of Arab Levies which is
administration by the people and for the people, and will be attended with far
greater economy than the present scheme offers.
Blood-feuds are a cherished heritage, and we have neither time nor the
wish to interpose. Where, however, such tribal disturbances bring insecurity
to the caravan route, the matter demands our attention and action.
The past policy of alternate inaction and vengeance may be relegated to a
dead past.
° Vide also ray memoran
dum of 7th Septemter 1905
above my No. 43 L of same
date.