File 600/1905 Pt 1 'Aden Hinterland: Treaty with Dthala' [‎388v] (38/174)

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be transferred to a more healthy situation on the Jihaf Mountain above D’thala,
a detachment can be furnished for the Political Officer. The question of a
Tribal Levy has yet to be considered. It may presently be found possible to
form such a Corps, recruited from all the tribes under our protection, raised on
somewhat similar lines to the guides under Lumsden.
16. For the sake of the country and in our^ own interests 1 strongly ^
recommend that a Political Officer be retained at 1) thala. #
Reasons for permanently maintaining a Politieil Officer and Ms escort at D’tfiala,
l The raison d’etre of our stay in the Hinterland is to afford moral support to the Amir
of D'thala and to keep in touch with the countr/ of Upper Yafai in view of a possible demarca
tion of the Turkish Border. So it has been declared.
2. Taking DYhala and its Amir first: it is inadvisable to recede till such time as the
Amir’s position is secure. He has been subjected c ironically to Turkish pin-pricks while we
were located 100 miles distant. The Turks have been too recently ejected from places between
ITthala and the frontier to forget theso were once in their possession. Once our back was
turned, history would repeat itself and that in spite of, or, perhaps, because of, defined
boundaries. \
3. Take, again, the constant fighting between Turks and Imam. If it continue and
no Political Officer be present on the scene, intrigues will be rife and we shall never know the
extent to which our Sultans and Chiefs are participating.
4. If, on the other hand, a compromise were effected we might, not inconceivably, witness
a disturbance of existing spheres of influence and a redistribution of terrain of a kind to render
some alteration in the boundary and the creation of a commerce, perhaps, with the Imam direct.
Whilst all this is in the air, I strongly deprecate any policy of retrogression.
5. Further, the Amir’s relations with his tribesmen and feudatories are still not of the
best. The powerful section of the Radfan tribes—the Kotaibi — would undoubtedly give him
trouble, if removed. The Sha’iri tribe whose habitat is chifly between D’thala and the Turkish
Frontier have not become reconciled to him because of Turkish intrigue there in the past. My
aim is to effect this reconciliation which is not possible except gradually. I am eonfideat
of success ia course of time. These Sha iri villages were lately in Turkish occupation and
it is here where iurkish intrigue will recommence, as we are marching back to Aden. To use
force against the Sha’iris is what would please the Amir, but I have shown him that acts
of repression will not care the sore, more especially were we the actors. Absolutely dependent
on us, he would collapse completely when we could no longer act as his prop. There
would forthwith begin a reign of vengeance.
6. I need not enlarge upon the lo^s of our prestige were we thus to bolster up an
unpopular Ruler and pose before his tribesmen as associated with his cause as against theirs.
We could not better ensure mal-Government.
7. My policy is to keep myself in the back ground, to prompt and suggest salutary measures
remembering that reform must perforce take root slowly which measures the Chief, working
along the lines of least resistance, will himself bring into practice and for which he will
receive all the credit. This system is necessarily a slow one. To hasten it would be its min.
It requires time to perfect it, and it is the sole satisfactory system. It calls for supervision on
the spot.
8. My work here is impliedly frontier. I would invite attention to the misleading nature
of this term. There can be no purely frontier work without peace and quiet within that
frontier. Work on the Frontier argues rest at our backs. We must first work up to a
frontier before we can localise our duties there. This we have still to do. I do not say the
Hinterland is restless. My meaning is that we know too little of it; have not as yet
stamped our likeness on its peoples. There is too little of the personal factor ” introduced
amongst the tribesmen, and it is therefore idle merely to watch the Turks in our front.
I am no advocate of itervention in purely tribal affairs but of disinterested advice with a
view to development of trade and sympathetic intercourse with the people,
9. If this is true of the border nearer to D’thala, how much more so in relation to Upper
Yafai, Bedtha and Behan. If an agreemeat has been effected and the delimitation has been
agreed upon, the practical demarcation still remains. We know but little of the Upper Yal;4i
tribes. .Lately they were at d’alliance wit a the Turks and t.vo of the Sultans in receipt of
Turkish stipends.
10. From my experience of its Sultans who are Legion I must record my opinion that we
have not made an altogether judicious selection of our nominees to stipends and there are many
men of note there still discontented. We cannot leave the Hinterland with Upper ¥afhi h* tQ ^ 6 7 8 9 10
condition. Our withdrawal will spell instant and constant intrigue. Upper Yafhi s secret
relations with the Imam, in the event of the compromise to which I have above alluded, is a
factor not to be minimised. These tracts were all once the Imam’s.