'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎21r] (41/248)

PART VIII.—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC. 39
depended on the difficulty of transport. The upshot was that at the date of the Battle
of Ctesiphon there were only reckoned to be five aeroplanes belonging to the Royal Flying
Corps in Mesopotamia, and of these only three seem to have been actually available at
the battle—a Maurice Farman, a B.E .2 C. and a Martinsyde. 'Phis reckoning does not
appear to include the naval aeroplanes, of which, however, only one was of any use. None
of these machines were fitted either for photography or with wireless apparatus; and
though valuable work was done, they were of course inadequate for what was required. The
personnel of the Royal Flying Corps was organised as a Flight, and there were six flying
officers and forty-four rank and file. During December, 1915, and January, 1916, owing
to two machines being shut up in Kut, to accidents, and to the ill-health of pilots, some
times only one aeroplane was available. Another Flight of aeroplanes was sent out in
February, 1916, and from then onward, the Royal Flying Corps maintained a supply
of new machines. After that date, there does not appear to have been a shortage in
numbers of machines, and from the same time apparatus both for photography and wireless
telegraphy came into use. But early in February, 1916, the Turkish troops, who till
then had been without aeroplanes, were furnished with three fast aeroplanes of the Fokker
type, which were much more formidable fighting mach nes than anything possessed by
the British Army. The presence of these fast machines with the Turkish Army placed the
British airmen at a great disadvantage ; and the want of at least one efficient fast fighting
machine was keenly felt.
10 . It is clear that the lack of a sufficient supply of aeroplanes of any kind in the
operations which led to the Battle of Ctesiphon seriously hindered our troops in the task
they had to perform, and that the want of fast fighting aeroplanes later prevented the Royal
Flying Corps being of as much service to the Expedition as they might have been. How
far these defects were remediable by the War Office opens up the wide question of the
general supply of aeroplanes for the purposes of the War, which has been the subject of
an independent enquiry. We are not in a position to express any opinion upon that ques
tion, and we certainly should not deny that the first claim upon the resources of the Royal
Flying Corps was in Europe and not in Mesopotamia. It is not, however, clear why a
larger number of aeroplanes of a type not sufficiently fast for service in France should
not have been available for the advance on Bagdad, nor why those which were sent
were not equipped for photography and wireless telegraphy. The difficulty of sparing
fast machines in the spring of 1916 to fight the three Turkish Fokkers is more intelligible.
But we note the deficiency of aeroplanes as one of the defects of equipment which
contributed to the ill-success of the British Army in Mesopotamia during the winter and
spring of 1915-16.
Drafts and Reinforcements. •
11 . In considering the question of reinforcement for the Mesopotamian Force, it must
be borne in mind that the term “ Reinforcements ” technically covers both the additional
units sent to strengthen the original force in the field, and drafts sent to replace wastage
in such units as are already in the country. We have, therefore, for the sake of clearness
used the term “ Reinforcements ” as covering additional units sent to augment the existing
strength of the force, and have placed under the heading “ Drafts ” all personnel sent to
make good casualties, whether they be from death, wounds, sickness or any other cause.
12 . As a basis of our enquiry into the supply of drafts to Force “ D,” it may be useful
to take the standard laid down in Field Service Regulations. At the same time it must be
remembered that after several months of experience of modern warfare this standard has
had to be considerably modified, and although it may be said that the Turks were not armed
and equipped in the same thorough manner as the Germans (at any rate during the earlier
stages of the campaign), yet against this must be set the fact that the expedition was
destined to fight in one of the most trying climates and disease-ridden countries in the
world, a fact of which the Indian Government and indeed the Home Government must have
been fully aware, and which accounted for a very large proportion of the wastage.
The Field Service Regulations state that units on mobilisation shall have additional
personnel known as “ first reinforcements ” to the extent of 10 per cent, of the rank and
file of each unit. Of the troops sent out of India to France and elsewhere, even had this
standard been attained to, which is not at all certain, wastage had eaten up the whole of