'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎26r] (51/248)

PART IX.—TRANSPORT.
40
A. Shortage of River Transport.
with the Government, who, on approving a plan assume responsibility in principle for the
provision of the requisite forces.” Sir J. Nixon assumed, and we think justly, that
“ requisite forces ” must be held to include all the requisite auxiliary services. In the
present case, the management of the Expedition had been devolved by the Home Govern
ment upon the Indian Government; it would seem, therefore, that the primary responsi- j
bility for providing the requisite river craft, not only for the original plan of campaign,
but also for the extension of such plans involved in the successive advances to Amara, Kut
and Baghdad, rested with the Indian Government.
22 . On the other hand the Regulations provide that the Commander-in-
Chief in the Field “ is responsible for the efficiency of the forces in the field,” and anticipate
that he is to make demands for what he requires. Where, therefore, as in the present
case, the efficiency of the forces was absolutely dependent on the supply of river craft,
it would seem clear that Sir John Nixon was responsible for placing his needs in river
craft before the Indian Government in an adequate manner and with anticipation.
23. Between the two authorities concerned, viz., the Government of India and the
General Officer Commanding in the Field, in our opinion there was to a large extent joint
and mutual responsibility. In any case, the true test is to be found in common sense,
and not in questioning the legal interpretation of what is in a book of Field Service
Regulations, written, no doubt in contemplation of very different circumstances from those
of the Mesopotamia campaign. In our view the situation called for co-operation, thoughtful
anticipation of needs, mutual and ready helpfulness. General Nixon’s expectations as
to the existence of suitable steamers, and the promptness with which they, or others
specially built in England, could be delivered in Mesopotamia, erred on the side of optimism,
but he was necessarily devoid of the requisite information on which to form a correct
judgment. The Government of India was in a position to know the facts, and, as regards
the all-important supplv of river steamers, failed lamentably in co-operation, anticipation
of needs and ready helpfulness. We consider that responsibility for the shortage of river
transport rests mainlv with the Government of India, in its various Departments. For
their failure in this matter, which was the foundation of all the troubles in Mesopotamia, i
no censure could, in the circumstances, be too grave. '
Provision of River Craft from India.
Bearing these considerations in mind, we now proceed to examine how the supply
of river craft for Mesopotamia was dealt with.
24. The general conditions in Mesopotamia were known in India at the beginning of
the war. The absence of roads, the importance of the rivers as means of communication,
many of the peculiar features of those rivers, and the number and class of river steamers
in the country in the autumn of 1914, are all noted in a small hand book of information
furnished to the Expedition by the Indian General Staff. Moreover, further particulars
as to navigation of the Tigris were accessible to the Indian Government—the Royal Indian
Marine had for years maintained a “ Station ” ship at Baghdad, and one of their officers,
Commander Hamilton, had made a survey of the Tigris in 1905-1907. We think, therefore,
that it was incumbent on the Indian Government to have foreseen that a large supply
of special river craft would become a necessity for the Expedition directly it advanced
above Kurna, the limit on the Tigris for ocean-going steamers.
25. This necessity and a responsibility for meeting it was indeed to some extent
recognised by the General Staff in India as early as December 30th, 1914, when they asked
General Barrett to find out how many steamers he could procure locally for use above
Kurna, and what number of craft he would require in the event of an advance up the
Tigris or Euphrates. General Barrett replied that he would require 7 more steamers
and some lighters. It is important to remember that this estimate of General Barrett
related only to his then force of roughly one division, although later on, when these steamers
were provided, viz., in April-May, 1915, it was apparently considered by the Indian Govern
ment that they constituted a sufficient increase of river transport to meet the needs of two
divisions. But in their communication to General Barrett the Indian Authorities did at
any rate definitely recognise some responsibility for ascertaining what river craft would be
required in the event of an advance. From this time, however, up to the beginning of
1916, they do not seem to have again recognised this responsibility. Before the advance
irom Kurna to Amara was sanctioned, they did not make any inquiries as to the sufficiency
(C 48—176) G