'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎26v] (52/248)

50
PABT IX.—TRANSPORT.
A. Shortage of River Transport. '
of the transport; before the advance from Amara to Kut-el-Amara was sanctioned they
contented themselves with obtaining general assurance from General Nixon that he was
able to maintain the force of a division or more at Kut in all states of the river. They made
no efforts to ascertain or estimate what the requirements in river craft would be for the
advance to Baghdad, or for the reinforcements which they sent or asked to be sent to
Mesopotamia. Indeed so much out of touch was Simla with the actual situation in Meso
potamia, that we find the Indian General Staff, in “ appreciations ” in June and September,
1915, definitely stating that the Expedition was well supplied with river craft, and using
this among their arguments for the advance to Baghdad.
26. During the whole period of the most important developments of the campaign,
viz., from January, 1915, to January, 1916, the attitude of the Indian Government, therefore,
seems to have been that they had little or no responsibility in the matter of providing .
river craft, beyond attending to the specific demands sent to them from Mesopotamia
itself. We think that both the regulations and common sense demanded that the
authority responsible for providing the requisite river craft should have taken greater
care to ascertain what was requisite. The Indian Government did not in fact exercise
that oversight and foresight over the needs of Mesopotamia in river craft which was
demanded of them by their position and responsibilities as the authority placed in-
management of the campaign. On the other hand, General Nixon did not in our
opinion sufficiently assist the Indian Government by informing them well beforehand of
his anticipated needs in river craft.
27. With regard to delay in fulfilment of orders for river transport we made inquiry
into the procedure, and investigated the causes of delay. Correspondence was usually
conducted between the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia and the Chief of
the Staff in Simla or Delhi. From the latter officer anything about river craft would be
transmitted to the Quartermaster-General, who would thereafter communicate what he
thought necessary to Captain Lumsden, the Director of the Royal Indian Marine
at Bombay. The work falling upon Captain Lumsden, R.N., and an insufficient staff,
in connection with ocean transport appertaining to four Indian Expeditionary Forces,
has been heavy. He was not in touch with all that was going on in Mesopotamia, nor
informed of the scope of the expedition. Neither the Quartermaster-General nor Captain
Lumsden appears to have fully appreciated in time—certainly down to July, 1915—
the seriousness of the river transport situation. Orders for craft involved a divided
responsibility between the Quartermaster-General up-country, who was in touch with
Mesopotamia but not with river craft, and the Director of the Royal Indian
Marine in Bombay, who was to some extent in touch with river craft but not with
Mesopotamia. The result has been lack of knowledge, initiative and resource, as well
of helpful anticipation in the important first nine months of the campaign. t
28. It was undoubtedly General Nixon's duty to formulate his own needs with
regard to class of vessels and to specify what was required, but it is, we think, unfortunate
that when difficulties first arose as to their specifications and draught, a competent person,
preferably with experience of river craft, was not at once sent from India to look into the
matter on the spot, and confer with General Nixon as to the usefulness or otherwise of
what could be obtained ready-made in India. But this was not done. Captain Lumsden
did not think it necessary to go himself j he failed to rise to the occasion, and in consequence
it was not till late in 1915 that boats in large numbers were offered by India which
might have been offered long before. Many of them were accepted by Mesopotamia,
and although a number proved unsatisfactory, some have been of use. In con
sequence of the delay, however, none of these boats arrived in Mesopotamia until early in
1916. Had they been available for General Nixon between October and November, 1915,
they would have materially lightened his transport problems, and might, perhaps have
even altered the history of the 1 campaign.
29. In response to General Barrett’s request, the first craft, namely 4 tugs and 7
paddle steamers, had been sent by India. They arrived in April—May, 1915. The
following is a paraphrase of the communications that ensued between General Nixon and
the Chief of the General Staff in India :—
May 21th, 1915. —Mesopotamia asked that in view of deep draught of steamers >
and tugs received, rendering them unreliable for use above Kurna, 6 tugs of 3 -ft.
draught should be sent.