'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎57r] (113/248)

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PART XIL—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Ill
A. Findings and Conclusions.
Origin, Inception and Conduct of Campaign.
W e find that:—
1. The expedition to Mesopotamia was a justifiable military enterprise, but one of
such a character that it required, during its inception and development, the most
careful watching and preparation.
2. The division of responsibility between the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and Indian Government,
the former undertaking policy, and the latter the management of the expedition,
was, in the circumstances, unworkable. The Secretary of State, who controlled the policy,
did not have cognisance of the capacity of the expedition to carry out the policy. The
Indian Government, who managed the expedition, did not accompany developments of
policy with the necessary preparations, even when they themselves proposed those develop
ments.
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3. The scope of the objective of the expedition was never sufficiently defined in
advance, so as to make each successive move part of a well-thought-out and matured plan.
4. The attempt in India entirely to control and regulate the wants of the
expedition from Simla was an administrative mistake, and representatives of the
Headquarter Staff with wide powers should from the first have been stationed at Bombay,
the port of embarkation and disembarkation to and from Mesopotamia.
5. The Commander-in-Chief himself, or his representatives acting as liaison
officers, should from time to time have visited Mesopotamia with a view to keeping the
Headquarters Staff in touch with the needs of the expedition. In consequence of such
want of touch, the Military Authorities at Simla did not appreciate or realise the difficulties
of campaigning in Mesopotamia, and from such lack of knowledge failed to make sufficient
provision for surmounting the difficulties and drawbacks.
6. The successive advances from Basra to Kurna, Kurna to Amara, and from Amara
to Kut were sanctioned as being necessary for the protection and consolidation of
positions already taken, and were therefore of a defensive character.
The Advance on Baghdad.
7. The advance to Baghdad under the conditions existing in October, 1915, was
an offensive movement based upon political and military miscalculations and attempted
with tired and insufficient forces, and inadequate preparation. It resulted in the surrender
of more than a division of our finest fighting troops and the casualties incurred in the ineffec
tive attempts to relieve Kut amounted to some 23,000 men. The loss of prestige associated
with these military failures was less than might have been anticipated, owing to the deep
impression made, throughout and beyond the lofcalities where the combats occurred, by the
splendid fighting power of the British and Indian forces engaged.
8. Various authorities and high officials are connected with the sanction given to
t his untoward advance. Each and all, in our judgment, according to their relative and
respective positions, must be made responsible for the errors in judgment, to which they
were parties, and which formed the basis of their advice or orders.
The weightiest share of responsibility lies wqth Sir John Nixon, whose confident opti
mism was the main cause of the decision to advance. The other persons responsible were :
in India, the Viceroy (Lord Hardinge), and the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Beauchamp Duff) ;
in England, the Military Secretary of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. (Sir Edmund Barrow), the Secretary of
State for India (Mr. Austin Chamberlain), and the War Committee of the Cabinet. Me
put these names in the order and sequence of responsibility. The expert advisers of the
Government, who were consulted, also approved the advance and are responsible for theii
advice, but the papers submitted to us suggest that the approval of the naval and militar}' )
experts was reluctant and was perhaps partly induced by a natural desire not to disappoint )
the hopes of advantage to the general situation, which the Government entertained
It is, however, notable that the experts unanimously anticipated no difficulty in the j;
advance on Baghdad, but only in holding it. We do not attach any share in the respon- ||
sibility for the decision to advance to Baghdad to the Councils of the Secretary of State
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