'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎57v] (114/248)

112 PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
A.— Findings and Conclusions.
for India and of the Viceroy, as we have been unable to ascertain from the evidence
laid before us that the advance to Baghdad was ever brought before them in such a
manner as to allow them to give their personal advice and opinion upon it.
9. We have included the War Committee of the Cabinet and the Secretary of State
for India amongst those upon whom responsibility for this misadventure rests. It is
true that the War Committee and the Secretary of State acted upon the opinion of their
expert military advisers, and that the Secretary of State only gave his assent to the advance
after he had received an assurance from the General on the spot that he had an available
force sufficient for his purpose. But so long as the system of responsible departmental
administration exists in this country, those who are political heads of departments in time
of war, whether they be civilian or military, cannot be entirely immune from the con
sequences of their own action. They have the option and power of accepting or rejecting
the advice of their expert subordinates. The acceptance by a chief of wrong advice from
expert subordinates may be an extenuation of, but cannot secure complete immunity from,
the responsibility for the evils which may ensue.
The Cabinet from the first laid down the principle, from which they never departed,
that questions jointly involving civil and military policy should, in existing circumstances,
only be decided by the Cabinet. This authority they exercised throughout, though at
times they largely delegated their powers to the War Committe of the Cabinet.
Supplies, Equipments, Reinforcements, etc.
The second portion of our Instructions refers to the supplies, equipment and reinforce
ments of the expedition, with special reference to the provision for the sick and wounded,
and the responsibility of the departments whose duty it was to minister to such wants.
Upon this part of our reference we find that: —
10. The general armament and equipment were on a scale intended for an Indian
frontier expedition, were not up to the standard of modern European warfare, and were quite
insufficient to meet the needs of the Mesopotamia Expedition. These shortcomings were
the natural result of the policy of indiscriminate retrenchment pursued for some years
before the war by the Indian Government under instructions from the Home Government,
by which the Army was to be prepared and maintained for frontier and internal use.
11. During the period for which the Indian Government were responsible, the com
missariat of the expedition cannot be said to have been up to the standard of our Army in
France, but there was no general breakdown. Discomfort and want were at times experi
enced, mainly through lack of transport, and as we point out in our Medical Section,
illness arose from serious deficiences in diet. The whole system of supply was on too
low a standard, and was badly organised. We have reason to believe that it has been
materially improved since the War Office became responsible for the commissariat.
The ration originally supplied to the Indian troops was deficient in nutritive qualities,
and a serious outbreak of scurvy ensued. Since then this ration has twice been improved,
but it still requires careful attention as to the adequacy of its nutritive powers.
In other essentials the expedition was badly and insufficiently equipped, and as we
have shown in previous parts of our report, little, if any, effort was made to remedy
deficiencies until the War Office took over the expedition. It is difficult to arrive at any
conclusion in this part of our enquiry other than, that the wants of the expedition received
meagre attention and illiberal treatment at the hands of the Simla authorities during the
years 1914-1915.
12. As regards reinforcements, we find that up to the occupation of Kut in September,
1915, the Mesopotamian Expedition was, in fact, numerically strong enough to cope with
the Turkish forces brought against it. The arrangements for drafts and reinforcements
had, however, from the first, been lacking in co-ordination as between the Indian and Home
authorities, and this want of co-ordination led to the failure to supply effective reinforce
ments in connection with the advance on Baghdad and the operations for the relief of Kut.
Transport.
13. The enquiries we have made, and the evidence, both oral and documentary,
which we have taken in this part of our investigation, lead us to the following
conclusions regarding the critical period up to April, 1916 :—
(a) From the first the paramount importance, both of river and railway transport
in Mesopotamia, was insufficiently realised by the military authorities in India.