'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎77v] (154/248)

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Hospitals at Basra and Amara, which are partly located
in buildings, both the sick and the troops have as a rule
to be accommodated in tents or mat huts, in a country
where variations of temperature make the climate
extremely trying. We have no desire to minimise the
errors and omissions referred to in this report, but we are
not unmindful of the fact that many of the complaints
made by officers in regard to the hardships of service in
Mesopotamia, are partly due to the unfavourable com
parisons which they draw between their present surround
ings and those which they enjoyed in France. They miss
the spells of rest in billets which followed turns of duty in
the trenches, and many find it hard to realise that
conditions of life which are possible in Europe, even in
war time, are not possible for soldiers campaigning in
the East, in circumstances of unusual difficulty.
110. In referring to the defects attributable to a faulty
system, we do not wish to create the impression that these
defects are alone responsible for the breakdown in the
medical arrangements, for there is abundant evidence that
inertia, want of foresight and lack of co-ordination, have
been important factors in the situation. We have already
referred, and shall have occasion to refer again, to the
first two of these factors, but it will be convenient here to
discuss the question of co-ordination. It is laid dowm in
the Field Service Regulations that the General Staff is
responsible that, with due regard to secrecy, constant and
accurate information as to the situation and probable
requirements of the troops is furnished to the other
branches of the staff in sufficient time to enable these
requirements to be met. We doubt whether sufficient
attention was paid to this rule in certain phases of the
campaign. Complaint was made to Sir John Nixon
that the secretiveness of his General Staff was causing
inconvenience to the administrative services. Conferences
were held at headquarters from time to time, at which
plans were considered. It is stated, however, that
Surgeon-General Hathaway did not attend these confer
ences, except when the subjects discussed related directly
to the medical administration. He was thus less in
touch with the general situation than other Heads of
Administrative Services, and we think that this had an
unfavourable influence on the working of his branch.
111. There is reason to believe that the lack of co
ordination arising from the secretiveness referred to, and
other causes, attracted the attention of the authorities
in India, as we find that on December 24th, 1915, the
Chief of the General Staff, India, made special enquiries
of Sir John Nixon as to whether he was satisfied that
his General Staff was in sufficiently close touch with the
Medical Services to ensure that the latter knew when
extra demands were likely to be made on them. Sir
John Nixon replied that he was “ perfectly satisfied.”
We regret that we cannot endorse this view, as there is
evidence that on this and on other occasions the want
of co-ordination and co-operation between the different
branches of the staff, particularly between the Inspector-
General of Communications and the medical services, was
the source of great inconvenience.
112. Landing at Fao and battle of Suhil .—Having
discussed these general points, we proceed to examine
the manner in which the deficiencies referred to, and
others of a temporary and local character, have affected
the various stages of the operations, beginning with the
landing at Fao. We think that, in regard to the early
part of the campaign, it will meet all reasonable require
ments if the operations up to and including the occupation
of Basra are considered together. The casualties at the
landing at Fao and in the two subsequent engagements
were small, and the collection of the wounded presented
no serious difficulty. It was not until the battle of Sahil
that real opposition was encountered. The number of
field ambulances landed was sufficient to deal with the
casualties, which aggregated about 500. The intention
was to remove the wounded as soon as possible to the
river bank and place them on shipboard. During the
progress of the battle, however, a violent sand-storm
occurred which rendered this impossible. The result was
that the bearer sub-divisions of the field ambulances,
having brought their patients to the river bank by evening,
had to improvise such shelter as was possible for them
in date palm groves, and there was some difficulty in
procuring suitable food. Colonel Jennings, I.M.S., who
was in command of a field ambulance and had remained
with the headquarters of his unit, was unable to get to
the river bank that night owing to want of stretchers.
He, therefore, remained out in the open with 30 patients,
making such arrangements as he could for feeding and
sheltering them. The next day all the wounded were
removed to a transport in the river. It must be admitted
that the wounded on this occasion suffered some dis
comfort, and that it would have been better if tents
and supplies had been forthcoming on the river bank.
We think, however, that the discomfort was not very
serious, being due rather to unavoidable weather con
ditions than to any defect in the arrangements, and we
consider that in the circumstances the evacuation of
the wounded was satisfactory. It was unfortunate that
Colonel Jennings was left out with his patients, but he
was under the protection of the rear-guard, and we are
informed that search parties were sent out to find him,
though, owing to the violence of the dust-storm, they
failed to do so.
113. The arrangements for receiving the wounded on
shipboard were, however, not satisfactory. The absence
of any properly equipped hospital ship was at once felt,
and transports, which were not suitable, had to be con
verted into temporary hospital ships. One of these
steamers was the “ Varela,” another being the “ Erin-
pura.” We have evidence that the “ Varela ” was in no
way suitable for the accommodation of sick and wounded.
She had animals on board, and was also loaded with /
ammunition, which she was discharging from time to
time, while she was being used as a hospital ship. We / {
cannot, therefore, but regret that a regular hospital ship
was not sent out with the force, or that some more suitable
vessel was not prepared for the reception of the sick and
wounded. There does not appear to us to have been,
at this stage, any real deficiency of medical personnel or
equipment. It has been stated that there was a shortage
of chloroform, but we do not think that this is proved.
It is true that a box which was part of the equipment of
the British General Hospital, supposed to contain a supply
of chloroform, was found to be empty ; but we have clear
evidence that sufficient supplies of this drug were available
from other sources.
114. Immediately after the action it was decided to
send back all serious cases of sick and wounded, of which
the number was now considerable, to India. The trans
port “ Erinpura ” was used for this purpose—n, mixed
convoy of 224 British and Indians being despatched in
her to Bombay. We have no reason to think that the
medical staff and equipment for this vessel were actually
insufficient, though they were apparently only just
adequate ; but the inconvenience consequent on the lack
of a proper hospital ship, with separate personnel and
equipment, was apparent. In the first place the medical
staff of the expedition had to be depleted to furnish the
necessary medical personnel for the ship. In the second
place, it is difficult—indeed almost impossible—to treat
a large number of serious cases properly on a transport
which has not the conveniences and appliances of a
regular hospital. Thirdly, the equipment had to be
improvised out of the stores provided for the force. We
do not think that it is safe in such circumstances to
depend entirely on improvised equipment, as many articles
which are necessary may be overlooked.
115. Occupation of Basra. —The medical arrangements
during the occupation of Basra call for very little remark.
On the arrival of the troops the Sheikh of Mohammerah’s
palace was taken over and prepared as a hospital, and
shortly afterwards the British General Hospital took
possession of it. It is a suitable building for the purpose,
and during this period of the operations the personnel
and equipment were adequate. Some complaints have
been made as to the quantity and quality of the food
supplied to the patients. We admit that there may,
for a short time, have been some discomfort owing to
the inevitable difficulties of establishing a new hospital in
a city which had only just been occupied. We do not
think, however, that there was much ground for com
plaint, and from what we have seen and heard, we are
of opinion that the officers of the hospital, both then and
throughout the campaign, have spared no effort to secure
the maximum of comfort for the sick and wounded in
their charge.
116. Occupation of Kurna. —In December, 1914, the
operations were confined to the actions at Muzaibila and