'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎78r] (155/248)

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the capture of Kurna. In these engagements the wounded
numbered under 200, and the medical arrangements
appear to have been generally adequate, the only serious
defect being the lack of river hospital steamers to which
reference has already been made. Owing to the climatic
conditions during this season of the year, and the short
ness of the journey, the discomfort thus caused was
insignificant compared with the sufferings in later stages
of the campaign.
117. The general hospitals at Basra were not over
crowded from December to March. The personnel and
equipment were ample, and the food supplied, though
not ideal, was the best procurable.
118. Operations round Ahwaz. —The next phase in the
campaign to be considered is the operations up the
Karun river, which began with the despatch in February
of a small column under General Robinson to Ahwaz.
This force, according to the evidence given to us, was
accompanied by the bearer sub-division of a section of
a field ambulance, and one section of a clearing hospital
with four 160-lb. tents. The arrangements for the
collection and evacuation of the wounded in the engage
ment of March 3rd cannot be said to have been satis
factory An East India Company trading post. . No field ambulance establishment, as far as
we have been able to ascertain, accompanied the column
from Ahwaz to the battlefield, and the regiments engaged
depended entirely on their own medical officers and
stretcher-bearers. During the retreat, which was of a
somewhat hurried character, a number of the severely
wounded had to be abandoned, and there is little doubt
but that they fell into the hands of hostile Arabs. Some
wagons of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which had
been commandeered, were taken out for the transport
of the wounded back to Ahwaz ; but the Persian drivers
fled when the action began, and the carts were by some
mistake driven into a nullah from which the mules could
not be extricated. In consequence these vehicles could
not be used for the purpose for which they had been
taken out. The number of stretchers available was very
limited and many of these were abandoned, so that of
the seriously wounded a few only got back to camp.
Those who reached Ahwaz were treated by the medical
units there, and no complaints as to the arrangements
at this period have been made to us. In the circum
stances we think that the want of success in evacuating
the wounded was due more to military reasons than to
any defect in the medical arrangements.
119. During the subsequent operations of General Gor-
ringe up the Karun and Kharkeh rivers, and during the
march from Illah to Amara, which have already been
described, the arrangements for the treatment of the
sick and wounded were not, in our opinion, as good as
they might have been. The medical establishment with
the force was two field ambulances plus two sections of
a cavalry field ambulance and part of a clearing hospital.
During the march to Amara one field ambulance and the
clearing hospital remained at Ahwaz, and four sections
of a field ambulance were posted at Illah. One British
and one Indian section of a field ambulance marched
with General Gorringe’s force to Amara. The number of
wounded, either at Illah or elsewhere, was very small,
but there was a good deal of sickness during the operations
and the medical arrangements, though possibly the best
that were feasible, were not satisfactory in some respects.
The field ambulance at Illah was used as a stationary
hospital, and with accommodation for, 100 patients had
to treat as many as 250 on one occasion. The hospital
and field ambulance at Ahwaz were also overcrowded.
The field ambulance at Ahwaz, according to the evidence,
had to treat from May 27th up to the first week in August
an average of 375 patients, British and Indian, daily.
Indeed these operations illustrate very clearly the dis
location in the medical organisation to which we have
already referred in criticising the general arrangements.
The difficulties of the medical services were further
increased, as the personnel was from time to time depleted
by the detailing of officers and men for convoy dut^, and
by sickness and other causes. Nor was the accommoda
tion provided for all the patients suitable. In Ahwaz,
for a part of the time, the patients of the clearing hospital
wore accommodated in dug-outs and in the house of a
local Sheikh, but a number of sick both at Ahwaz and
at lilah were housed in single fly tents of 160 lbs. which
are not, and cannot be rendered, suitable for sick persons
in a temperature of 125 degrees. The discomfort of the
patients was increased by a plague of flies, and at Illah
and at other places by a lack of ice. From time to time
the supply of medical comforts was barely sufficient. In
these circumstances it is not surprising that the sick
siiffered considerably, but there is no evidence that the
mortality among them was high or that this discomfort
led to any fata] results.
120. In the march to Amara the amount of land
transport supplied for medical purposes was inadequate.
Up to Bisaitin the wounded of the column, which moved
on one bank of the river, were apparently evacuated to
Ahwaz via Illah in motor cars and transport carts, and
if more motor cars had been available the use of transport
carts would not have been necessary. For the column
on the other side of the river an insufficient number of
riding mules formed the only ambulance transport.
From Bisaitin on to Amara the wounded were carried
forward with the column in transport carts ; the tempera
ture was very high, and the patients suffered much from
heatstroke. Owing to sickness among the transport
ponies there was occasional difficulty in securing even
transport carts for the sick. Fortunately the force met
with little or no opposition from the Turks on its march,
or the consequences might have been serious.
121. For the evacuation of patients from Ahwaz to
Basra ordinary river steamers were used, and the general
criticism of the use of this form of transport applies to
this period of the campaign, though the patients were
better off than those in the large convoys which came
down the Tigris later. The evacuation from Ahwaz
was, however, sometimes delayed because the medical
staff at Ahwaz and Illah was so small that it was not
always possible to find the necessary personnel for the
steamers as promptly as was desirable.
122. Recently, the force in occupation of Ahwaz has
been very small. There is nothing to lead us to think
that the medical arangements do not work satisfactorily,
though it would be more in accordance with the normal
organisation if a small stationary hospital were located
there. The lack, however, of proper land and water
transport might at any time be a source of trouble.
123. Battle of Shaiba or Barjasiyah .—The medical,
arrangements for the battle of Shaiba were generally
satisfactory, though the field units which accompanied
the force must have been pressed very severely, having
regard to the number of casualties. The medical units
accompanying the force consisted of No. 2 Combined
Field Ambulance, half of No. 3 Combined Field Ambu
lance, a portion of a Cavalry Field Ambulance, and No. 57
Stationary Hospital. The total number of wounded was
approximately 1,100, but the casualties, though they
occurred mainly in the last day's fighting, were distri
buted over several days. For unavoidable reasons the
evacuation of some of the wounded to Basra was delayed,
but according to the evidence before us they were all
properly fed and attended to immediately after the action.
Much of the country between Basra and Shaiba was at
this time under water, and the evacuation was effected
in very unfavourable conditions, as part of the journey
had to be done by land and part by water. For the first
part of the journey stretchers and transport carts were
employed, and although the suffering caused by these
carts must have been considerable, we doubt whether in
the circumstances motor ambulances, or indeed any form
of wheeled ambulance transport, could have been used.
A clearing station was located at the point where the
journey by water began. The wounded were fed and
examined at this station, the wounds of such as required
attention being re-dressed. They were then sent on in
specially prepared heliums to the Zobeir Gate, the boat
cushions being used as mattresses for lying down cases.
No other form of conveyance could have been used,
unless special motor boats of very shallow draught had
been provided. At the Zobeir Gate the wounded were
again fed and tended by the officers of No. 19 Clearing
Hospital. They were then despatched either direct to
the hospitals, or carried in motors and transport carts tb
a steamer which conveyed them to the General Hospitals
at Basra. It has been suggested that there was, even
at this stage of the campaign, a breakdown in the medical
arrangements, and it has been said in particular that the
Turkish wounded captured in the engagement did not
receive prompt and proper attention. We are not pre