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to make Asir pay. He doubtless knew then, or if not then, he learnt later, of the
machinations of the Dabbaghs and other outsiders to stir up revolt in Asir in
collusion with certain tribes and certain members of the Idrisi family. Indeed,
he prevented one of these, Ali-al-Idrisi, from going back from the Hejaz to his
country and sent him to Riyadh instead. He probably thought, however, that the
mt de feat of Ibn Rifada would dismay the conspirators, whose original plan was that
_e revolt in Asir should synchronise with, and slightly precede, the invasion from
the north.
107. Eahd-bin-Zuair appears to have been rough with the Idrisi. He
probably saw more clearly than the King how things were moving in Asir itself.
It appears from correspondence subsequently published that as early as the
26th September he and Ibn Madhi, the inspector of the province, began to
telegraph alarmist reports. The King’s replies enjoined on them to conciliate the
Idrisi. The latter himself sent at least one loyal telegram just before the end
of October, but he complained of the deportation of his relative, Ali, and he had
grievances against Ibn Zuair. The King was ready to believe that the latter
had mismanaged things and sent a mission to investigate. He also began to
send forces to Asir, though he still did not despair of a settlement. Before his
mission could reach the spot, the Idrisi had put himself at the head of the rebels.
They took Jizan, the seat of the Saudi Governorate, on the 6th November and
interned the Amir and the other Saudi officials. Even after this, the Idrisi
continued to profess loyalty and to have no grievance, except against Ibn Zuair.
The outrage was, however, too patent. The Saudi forces moved and retook Jizah
on the 17th November. Their tenure of it was insecure and the country inland
was up. The King poured further forces southward. First and last, there were
apparently three expeditions, one along the coast, one further inland under
Khalid-bin-Luwey and one from Nejd, where large contingents of Ikhwan were
called out, under the King’s nephew, Khalid-bin-Muhammad. Ibn Musaid, the
Governor of Hail, was despatched to Abha with the intention of making him
Governor-General of Asir.
108. These events filled some weeks. The troops under Khalid-bin-Luwey
reached Sabya shortly before the 23rd December, having lost their leader on the
way, from illness, it was said. On the 25th December Fuad Bey Hamza told
Sir Andrew Ryan that the authority of the Government had been restored as far
as a line running inland from Madhaya, a small port some 25 kilom. south of
Jizan. A communique of the 30th December claimed that the majority of the
revolted tribesmen had submitted within a period of grace allowed early in the
month and that the only tribes still in revolt were the Masariha and part of the
Beni Shubayl, with whom were the Idrisi and his people. According to
subsequent information, the troops at Sabya and Jizan, having joined forces,
moved forward on the 28th December, took Madhaya next day, swept the littoral
as far as the frontier, and advanced on Abu Arish on the 30th December. It may
be added in anticipation of the report for 1933 that they occupied that place on
the 1st January. The Government claimed that the revolt was effectively ended
and that it only remained to deal with unimportant remnants. The Idrisi was,
however, still at large in the mountains, and it was not known how formidable he
and his supporters might still prove to be in the inland area. It was not known
either what had become of the third force sent from Nejd under the command of
the King’s nephew.
109. The longanimity which Ibn Saud displayed towards the Idrisi
throughout the earlier stages of this business was remarkable. It may be that
he realises the difficulty of holding Asir permanently in defiance of the Idrisi
family and the tribes which support it. It may have been part of a larger policy
of conciliation, of which there was other evidence in the latter part of the year.
It was noted that the King made definite attempts in the autumn to mitigate the
hostility of the Mutair and the Ajman by generous treatment, and tried to attract
back to his territory chiefs sojourning in exile in Iraq. Again, when the Beni
Atiya re-entered Saudi Arabia in the circumstances already described, he did
not fall upon them as some had feared he might, but seemed anxious to treat
with their leaders.