File 2182/1913 Pt 9 'Arabia Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎158r] (313/406)

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.stranded. Then it was that he saw in his proposed deputation to Naid a
providential means of escape from Basrah where his position had now become
highly precarious and he left hurriedly for Ibn Saud’s camp, via Zubair
MeanwhBe the Wahhabi Chief, m response to Turkish exhortation, had plead
ed that he could spare no troops for the ‘Iraq till he had reduced Ibn Bashid
o is rightful state of vassalage. To the British message he replied that he
was unshaken m his long-standing desire for intimate relations with us But
he was not unnaturally reluctant to take open part with us until he was satis^
fied that our change of front towards himself was likely to be permanent
and m spite of his personal confidence in Captain Shakespear it was with
some misgiving that he consented to his visit. The meetiim tool' nlacp rm
December 31st at-Khufsah near Majma‘ in SudaiT X sfud spoke wift
great frankness. Before compromising himself wholly with the hurts he
asked that our assurances of support should be embodied'in a formal treaty
the terms of which were drafted forthwith. They included a guarantee ?f
complete independence on our part and an undertaking on the part of Ibn
Saud that he would have no dealings with other Powers except after reference
to the British Government He informed Captain Shakespear that he had
been m communication with the Sharif and with the heads of the northern
Anazah confederation and that they were resolved to stand together. He was
holding m detention a party of four envoys sent by the Turks to urge him to
join. Ibn Rashid m a against us, but after consultation with Captain
Shakespear the Turkish mission was dismissed with the reply that Ibn Kashid’s
forces were camped within two days of Ibn Saud and that there could now be
ten qU M tl0n n f P6aCe then V 0n Januar y 17th a messenger arrived
Hp a ±r ° m t le Sharif ’ s son > Abdullah, who wrote that
the Sharif had been called upon to proclaim the jihad and was temporising
till he heard what line Ibn Saud proposed to take. Ibn Saud made an answer
and hlVhte^p 0 lf a i 7an - a ^ t0 rr tlle ,^ S in j °- inillg tlle 0ttomaI i Government
and had himself dismissed a Turkish deputation empty-handed.
Upon the reports sent by Captain Shakespear from Ibn Saud’s camp, Sir
Percy box was authorised to proceed with the negotiations for the treaty, but
on January 24th battle was joined between Ibn Saud and Ibn Eashid and
Laptam Shakespear, unarmed and present only as a spectator, met his death.
of ?! dlsaste . r U as that he was shot dead by a Shammar
iifie-buliet, but this statement is m any case based only on second-hand
information, as it is undisputed that Captain Shakespear had taken up a
position m a different part of the field than that where his host was located
Smce then various and divergent accounts of what happened have been recited
one of little more value than another, but the balance of evidence goes to
show that he was first wounded in the leg and disabled, and soon afterwards
villed m the charge of Ibn Eashid s cavalry which overwhelmed the flank
on which he was posted In the sauve qui pent which ensued it is feared
that he was either abandoned or forgotten, but the precise circumstances of
Jif 1111 * 1 ! y d ® atl1 Probably never be ascertained. Ibn Saud expressed
I ofound regret for the loss of one whom he regarded as a brother, and always
refers to him with respect and affection. <^vvays
The action was indecisive: both parties claimed the victory and both
were temporarily crippled and forced to retire. It was an unexpected and
a somewhat disconcerting result, for Ibn Saud’s preparations had been made
? t 1 U < ^ ce PG° Ilal scale and hi 8 forces were said largely to outnumber those
aUi n i b °T J \ G inferi0 1 r 111 cavalry. The accounts given by the
Arabs attribute his defeat to the treachery of the Ajman. Ibn Saud’s personal
b ? y0 ? d v qUeS -I 0n ’ but lle * ot uncoinm only falls short as a tactician,
and Mubarak of Kuwait pronounced him to be a poor leader in battle. But
if he had not dealt Ibn Eashid a crushing blow, he had at least put him out
alK J P reve nted him from joining the Turks, as he unquestionably
would have done. The intervention of Ibn Eashid in the early part of the
Mesopotamian campaign might have added considerably to our difficulties.
Nevertheless Captain Shakespear s death was a heavy price to pay for the
advantage of immobilizing him. F J
The two chiefs held apart without further hostilities till the summer
when an agreement, dated June 10th, was concluded between them. Ibn Eashid
lecognised Ibn Saud s claims, except that of overlordship which he could
scaicely be expected to acknowledge, and undertook not to play a treacherous
game towards the Turkish Government but to incline towards whichever Gov
ernment was m alliance with Ibn Saud. He confined his own jurisdiction
ij i an T it 8 vR^^ 8 and Gi 0 Shammar tribes, while Ibn Saud was acknow
ledged to hold all INajd from A1 Khahaf to Bawasir. A1 Khahaf is no doubt
the Kahafah of Hunter’s map, a little north of latitude 27 degrees. In a
tribal country the adjustment of frontiers can never be very exact, but it is
clear that Ibn Eashid renounced all pretensions to the Qasim, a province
whose rich oases had frequently changed hands. It is of interest to note that
the tribes reckoned as subject to Ibn Saud are the Mutair, Ataibah, Harb,
Ba,ni Abdullah, Ajman, Murrah, Manasir, Bani Haja, Subai, Salmi, Qahtan
and JJawasir, but this catalogue must not be taken as exact, for the Mutair are