File 4345/1912 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎7v] (19/330)

the granting of a loan; (2) to the financial administration; and (3) to the strengthening-
of the gendarmerie. He said that a stalement had recently appeared in the press that
a loan of 400,000L was going to he made to Persia jointly by Great Britain and Bussia.
He hoped that was true. He understood that commnnications had been in progress
concerning railway concessions. No doubt it was desirable that the terms of those
concessions should be finally agreed upon before money was advanced, but once the
terms had been settled he trusted that there would be no delay in granting the loan.
He wished to know whether any undertaking had been given by the Persian Govern
ment as to the application of the loan, and whether some better form of financial
administration would be set up in Tehran. In his opinion it would be very desirable
to establish there a treasury board or an advisory council, consisting, for example, of
a Russian, a Britisher, and a Persian, or a representative of some neutral Power, to see
that the money w r as properly applied. Mr. Shuster had said that Persia could give
security for a loan of 4,000,000b or 5,000,000b No doubt a considerable part of that
loan would be earmaked for the purposes of the gendarmerie. He had on a previous
occasion expressed his admiration of the work of the Swedish officers in perfecting that
force; but he asked the Government to consider the desirability of introducing some
British officers from India who were familiar with natives and native troops and with
the language. He had never advocated sending a military expedition to Persia, nor
did he wish to give the Russian Government any excuse for increasing their powers in
Northern Persia; but he thought that the Persian gendarmerie might well be
strengthened by lending a number of British officers not to displace, but to assist the
Swedish officers in increasing the gendarmerie and making it more efficient.
Viscount Morley said he was very glad that the noble lord saw the problem on the
whole in much the same light as did the Government. What he had said about the
Persian gendarmerie with Swedish officers was perfectly true, and it was valuable to
have the recognition of an undisputed friend of Persian nationality like the noble lord
taking that view. In December last one of the Government’s leading agents had a
long conversation with the commandant of the Swedish officers, who said that he had
now a very considerable staff of Persian officers and non-commissioned officers at his
disposal in an efficient state of preparation ; but he would like to have 300 or 400 more
men if the necessary funds were forthcoming. The commandant had at hand ample
material for an instructor class, which would create a larger force if the funds needed
were obtained. The noble lord was not quite accurate when he said nothing had been
advanced to Persia. The matter of the murder of Captain Eckford was a terrible and
deplorable incident in the great road problem it was incumbent upon us to solve,
because we were more interested than any other Power in the trade on the great
southern road. After that incident the Government could no doubt have sent a
punitive expedition and have undertaken the duty of policing the road and restoring
at least a superficial semblance of order. But there were enormous objections to
sending a punitive expedition, and it was not a course for which the Government could
make themselves responsible. Experience ebowed only too abundantly that it was
very easy to take the first step in a movement of that kind, but very hard to end it.
The noble lord would see that for this country to have undertaken the pacification of
the southern road and its regeneration from its present abominable condition would
be really to impair the authority of the Persian Government; and with a view to giving
the Persian Government the best chance we could, we should abstain from any move of
a military or semi-military kind which would involve us in obligations not only irksome
to ourselves but extremely disadvantageous to the Persian Government, in whom we
were interested.
The Gendarmerie.
Ihen the noble lord asked whether the Government were considering the
expediency of adding to the gendarmerie a leaven of British officers from India. Very
little reconsideration would, he thought, convince the noble lord that that would be a
very risky proceeding, because the Swedish officers were undertaking a veiy unwelcome
responsibility, and it ay on Id be a very risky operation to add to the force another
foreign element. Those who Avere best able to judge had warned the Government that
the introduction of these officers would be most likely to lead to friction and jealousy.
Ihe difficulties which Avould arise seemed to His Majesty’s Government to justify the
rejection of the proposal of the noble lord. None of the reforms desired in Persia-
could take place Avitkout money. It Avas proposed to raise 400,000b more, 200,000b in
Great Britain and 200,000b in Russia. The expenditure of that 400,000b, and also
anothei 100,000/.. to be raised in Great Britain alone for the special case of the