'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎82r] (168/294)

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The Jewish Supernumeraries achieved this largely by a generous
discharge of S.A.A. and Verey lights on the slightest alarm, and as a
rule the noise and the demonstration in general drove off thp Arab
attackers with few casualties to either side. The normal procedure
in the almost nightly "attacks” on Jewish colonies was somewhat as
follows. The Arabs would take up positions behind suitable cover after
dark from which they could fire at longish range. The first round
would be the signal for the Supernumeraries to man their defence posts
and ooen heavy rifle fire in the direction of the enemy, accompanied as
a rule by Verey lights. For' a short time a fire fight would go on
during which targets would seldom be visible to either side and neither
would move from their prepared cover. Eventually the Arabs, fearing
tne arrival of reinforcements and feeling that honour had been satis
fied would withdraw in the dark and return to their homes for the
right’s rest - 8 to 10 p.m. would usually be the hour of attack and all
would be over well before midnight. In the meanwhile news of the
attack would have reached a police post by telephone - or the news of
the light signals would have been passed on - and a couple of truckloads
of British Police or troops, or often both, would make for the scene.
In most cases either the sound or lights ox the cars would bo ilxe final
signal for any Arabs who still remained to slip away by familiar tracks
long before the reinforcements could gain contact.
Action of the type described may sound very unenterprising, but
on the other hand it is difficult to see wnat else the oupernumercu ieo
could have done with their small numbers and lack of tactical training.
Their object after all was to drive off Arabs attacking their colonies,
and this they invariably succeeded in doing. Few Arabs ever actually
set foot inside a colony and most of the casualties they inflicted were
the work of stray bullets. Besides at times carelessness on tne part
of the attackers or an ingenious surprise on the part of reinforcements
would result in rebel casualties. The Arab Supernumeraries if attacked
would carry out exactly the same procedure, but it is to be feared that
-too often they purchased immunity for the property in tneir charge ^ y
exchanging live rounds for empties. But that sort of thing is perhaps
only to be expected when members of the defence forces are drawn from
the same section of the population as the reoels themselves, he
logic of employing them for this purpose is open to question.
The great drawback of the Supernumeraries was the handicap they
often placed on military action. Their indiscriminate shooting at
night was a real danger to troops operating in the vicinity, wm e
their liberal use of the S.O.S. signal resulted in too maiiv roopo
being employed on profitless tasks. Difficulties v/ere increase
the fact that their lack of proper organization made it almost unpos
for trooos to arrange any proper co-operation vith oiem as W1 p
regular police. The solution would have been to organize and o^icer
the Supernumeraries on the pattern of the regu ar po ice,
possible, to place the whole police system under tne commander o, ti
military forces.
THE SHPLOYIEH?
OF
TPOOPS ON DEFEDSIVE DJTIES
General
Certain restrictions on the use of letha! weapons had aHt^^
bearing on the value of troops for these de ensive W rules
military or a police role. In particular there were tnree rules