'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎82v] (169/294)

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imposed by the Palestine Government to obviate danger to innocent
persons which proved to be a serious handicap. They were worded as
follows * ~
(i) No person should be fired on by troops for failing to hai +
when chal lenged unless that person is s een or known to be iri—
possession of arms , or was seen to throw a bomb, ' “
(ii) Exception may be made at night when troops have been fi
on in the neighbourhood, or when a British Officer or Seri.earvT
considers that a person or a group of persons is acting wit h~~
hostile intention. In that case the order to fire sho uld be
given by the Officer or Sergeant .
(iii) The above does not affect the right of troops to fire in
s elf defence, or in the defence of civilians, or upon anyone ^
guilty of sabotage.
It is hardly necessary to make further comment on the difficulties
of conducting military operations under such restrictions, and the
dilemma of a sentry acting under those orders may well be imagined.
It will be noted that he could not open fire in order to prevent
sabotage, nor could he use his rifle to prevent a person approaching him
with tne intention of using a concealed revolver or bomb. There is
no doubt that the rebels got to know of these orders, and more than one
sentry fell a victim before they were altered. Continual representa
tions by the Force Commander did eventually succeed in securing some
revision, but it was not until the 3rd September that any important
alterations were made. From that date sentries were authorised to
" to P ro ^ ec t whatever they were guarding”, while the authority of
a _Brinish Officer or Sergeant” was extended to include any N.C.O, or
private soldier in command of a detachment. Even then the rules were bv
no oadiofac oory; while in addition the use of artillery, mortars
and nfie grenades was prohibited in the vicinity of buildings, and
™ at Jjewis ^ RS in towns and villages severely restricted.
e l lwGG . “ n °t the least of which was the psychological
e ^eco - uo reduce considerably tne value of troops in combatting
trie mtimidator and saboteur.
Troops used as Police
S ° me ° f ^ he consequences of using police to do the work of troops
p" 6n ' SCribed, but more se rious still were the conse-
utterlv /w ^-^Hg^roopd as police. It was not always realised how
i . ^ . - 1 - • ej | eric the methods which each employs. Police organi-
Iccustomed to 1 ^^ SeCUre dis Persion, the policeman is trained and
the onlv uni 4 - 7° r ^ l"- 5 and tactical unit of the police - and
The soldier on the c* *** t 1 "? 1 ® coastable *
ponert n-p - .• d. n c!ia lo 01 course trained to act as a corn-
half a doser i nrH’i _,_ 0nce tne snia llost unit is split up into
its numbers.* In fact diEhlhr dTdndles out of a11 proportion to
essential air-fv-r -u , ^ -ion as opposed to concentration is one
difference^resul^ methods. A second
The policem-n»o ^ _ ni oR e -act cnat both have quite contrary objects:
inju?v Jo his to capture while causing the least possible
cause the greatest v^ Cne s °lBier ’ s sole aim is to kill or to
zation, equipment and'tn'di--*- 1 ^^’ • Since the soldier's whole organi-
naturally follo-'Y- ta-" i ni:r -g is directed towards this one object, it
L^rthe police°rrn ' 13 entire1 ^ “ted to achieve the bloodless
employing a P ac k of hounE ^teTl^VfTr^rL^ ^