'Persia. No 1 (1909). Correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia, December 1906 to November 1908' [‎113r] (209/236)

are infested with brigands, while in Kerman a notorious local outlaw named RAfat-i-
ISizam raised the standard of revolt at Eahry on the edge of the desert, and was not
crushed without some difficulty. The districts around, as far as Bam, suffered much from
pillage by both parties. Major Sykes reports a rumour of the presence of a very
strong hand of Turkoman raiders at Jajerm, north of Miandast, on the Tehran-
Meshed road.
Otherwise the country generally is in its normal state, but the general uncertainty
as to the future has produced a great falling-off of trade via Bushire, and the customs
receipts have diminished correspondingly. Except at Tabreez, nowhere in the provinces
is there any sign of activity on the part of the Oonstutionalists, and the country as a
whole seems to acquiesce, somewhat sullenly, in the existing state of affairs. Even the
knowledge of the disapproval expressed by the spiritual chiefs of the Shias at Najef
of the Shah’s coup d’Etat has produced as yet no visible effect.
In Tehran there has been perfect tranquillity, and the cessation to some extent of
the domiciliary visitations and petty persecutions has produced a certain return of
confidence. Thus here and there a few of the boldest of the Nationalists have
recommenced to hold secret meetings, and a few of the leaders of the party still
left at Tehran occasionally collect at Sani-ed-Dowleh’s house, hut it is doubtful
whether political affairs hold a prominent place in these discussions, as the conclaves
are disapproved of by the Shah and carefully watched by his agents. There is
much speculation as to the modifications of the Constitution and Electoral Law which
the Shah is said to be elaborating, but except that a “ Council of Empire ” has been
formed—of w r hose powers and attributes no one seems to know anything definite,
and which appears to have fallen flat—everything is wrapped in mystery. M. de
Hartwig says that the Senate, which was provided for in the Constitution, is to be called
into existence, but Ala-es-Sultaneh, who the Russian Minister considers would be an
ideal President, tells me that he knows nothing of it, nor is he aware that there is any
serious discussion of a remodelled Constitution. No doubt under the stimulus of
the identic communication made to the Shah by the British and Russian Legations on
the 8th instant, an announcement on the subject will appear at an early date. It is too
soon yet to pronounce on the effect of that communication on the populace of the
capital; hut it is to be hoped that it will revive the Nationalist spirit to take a practical
part in the elections, but even should the Shah be so unwise as to disregard the
friendly advice of the two Governments and refuse to convoke Parliament, it is unlikely
that the popular party will find the courage to do more than close the bazaars in sign of
protest.
It is not easy to know precisely what goes on at Bagh-i-Shah, or what influence
is uppermost with the Shah at any given moment, but it seems certain that Amir
Behadur Jang, Sepahsalar-i-Azam and Minister of War, is virtually dictator of
Persia. At the Council of Ministers, which meets daily in a tent in the garden,
his is always the deciding voice, and it is he who carries to the Shah his own
views, which he represents to be those of his colleagues. Ala-es-Sultaneh told me
that he was practically unable to see the Shah except in the presence of Sepahsalar,
whose interference in any question, however little he may he competent to discuss
it, always prevails. Amir Behadur has his most formidable rival in Ain-ed-Dowleh,
and it was probably owing to his influence that the latter was sent to the apparently
hopeless task of subduing the revolutionaries in Tabreez, and it is currently believed
that even now he is endeavouring to discredit the Govemoi-Geneial by thwarting his
efforts towards conciliation. , . ^ ^ cn t w
Amir Behadur appears to have only two objects, firstly, to induce the 8hah not to
reassemble the Medjliss, and, secondly, to enrich himself. There is no expedient that
is not being employed to obtain money nominally to carry on the Government, but
really to fill the coffers of the Minister of War and his friends. Extortion, sale of
Governorships and titles, and all the various devices common in the East are freely
resorted to and I do not think it would he an exaggeration to say that since the
beginning of July not less than 1,500,000 tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. must have been raised in this
manner possibly very much more. Probably not more than a third of this reaches
the Shah or is used for so-called public purposes, the remainder being divided up
amono* the “ khalvat ” (entourage). Yet the Shah is told that no money is available,
and fresh efforts are made in his name to squeeze more wherever it can be found.
Both banks are refusing to advance money to the Government on any pretext
whatever. _. 0
I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.