'Persia. No 1 (1910). Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia.' [‎259v] (116/179)

No. 199.
Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)
Sir, Gulahek, July 23, 1909.
IN continuation of my despatch of the 12th instant I have the honour to report that-
' the nationalist forces entered Tehran at 6 o’clock in the morning of the 13th instant.
The enclosed memorandum by Mr. Churchill gives an account of the circumstances of
their entry and the fighting that ensued.
On learning by telephone what had happened, I sent Major Stokes and Mr.
Churchill, to town, the former to control the admission of refugees to the legation, and
the latter to watch the course of events and report. Both were, if possible, to get into
touch with Sipahdar and Sardar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Assad, and enjoin upon them the necessity of main
taining order. The news which reached me by telephone just before it was cut was to
the effect that the nationalist forces were in possession of the town, and that good
order reigned. It transpired later that this was not accurate ; only a portion of the
capital v^as in their possession, and street fighting was in progress in other parts of
the town. Mr. Churchill and M. Evreinow, whom M. Sabline had sent to town, were
able later to report that Sipahdar and Sardar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Assad had given them the most satisfactory
assurances as regards the safety of foreign interests at the hands of the nationalists.
Throughout the fighting there was of course danger from stray bullets ; but, so far as I
know, only one foreigner, an Austrian, was hit, and his wound was slight. There was
absolutely no looting on the part of the nationalists, though one British house was
cleared of everything by some of the armed irregulars who fought on the royalist side.
These rrere the only persons who did any looting. The assurances given by the
nationalist leaders to the representatives of the two legations were thus justified.
Soon after the fighting began in town, a report reached me that the Shah was
about to bombard Tehran, and M. Sabline and I agreed to send in a joint protest to
His Majesty. I drafted a stiff note, which we afterwards toned down, as in the
meantime my colleague had received from the Shah a private assurance that the
bombardment would not take place.
Early next morning, however, we heard the boom of guns in the direction of
Kasr Kajar, and it was clear that the Shah had broken his promise. A little later His
Majesty sent us word that he had intended not to bombard Tehran without giving twenty-
four hours’ notice so as to give time to foreigners to leave the town, but that the revolu
tionaries were attacking his palace in the capital and he therefore had been compelled
to begin the bombardment at once. My colleague and I immediately proceeded to
Sultanatabad and begged His Majesty to desist and to proclaim a truce for negotiations.
In reply he proceeded to complain that we had repeated!}^ tied his hands by dissuading
him from attacking the^ revolutionaries. These had now entered Tehran and were
attacking his palace. TVe could not expect him not to do his utmost to oppose them.
I inally he declared that he would only grant a truce if the revolutionaries laid down
their arms. _ Except for the rescue of Tabreez, it is not the case that the Shah has ever
been restrained in his plans against the revolutionaries, but I did not think it worth
while entering upon a discussion on this point. I therefore merely reminded His
Majesty that the role of the two legations, since he had restored the constitution, had
been to urge conciliation upon both sides; unfortunately our advice had not been
followed by the revolutionaries. It was urgent now to consider what could be done to
save the situation, and, in the opinion of the two representatives, the only hope lay in
His Majesty proclaiming a truce. He said it would be impossible, as he could not
communicate with his troops, who were surrounded and were being constantly attacked.
In these circumstances an indispensable preliminary was that the revolutionaries should
lay down their arms. W e replied that it was useless to expect the victors to consent
to this, but if His Majesty would proclaim a truce for negotiations we thought we could
arrange that the message should reach both revolutionaries and ro 3 T alists. His Majesty,
however, would not hear of this and repeated that the revolutionaries must first
surrender.
On leav ing the palace we met Saad*ed“Dowleh, who, on learning the barren results
of our representations, asked us to defer informing Sipahdar and Sardar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Assad, whom
we had apprised of our audience, until he had seen His Majesty. Meanwhile,
Mi. Chiu chill and M. Baranowsky, who had been sent early in the morning, at the
lequest of the Shah, to try to induce the nationalist leaders to negotiate, had had to
tnrn back because of the fighting, which was then at its hottest. 1 Saad-ed-DowlelTs
com eisation with His Majesty, it may here be said, led to the appointment of a deputa-